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ABSTRACT 
In shared decision-making, doctors provide patients with information about 
difficult trade-off treatment decisions so the patient can make an informed choice. Many 
models of decision-making assume that patients make decisions based on long-term, 
stable preferences, but research suggests that people dynamically construct preferences 
for each decision. Affect plays at least two roles in preference construction. First, 
coherence shifting, or altering preferences prior to choice to make one alternative more 
attractive, may regulate emotion. Difficult decisions, imagining unpleasant outcomes, and 
threats to closely held goals produce general negative affect, and coherence shifting may 
reduce this. Second, preferences for alternatives may be constructed from immediate 
affective reactions, driving choice. 
Two dichotomous trade-off health decision scenarios were produced that are 
highly conflicted on outcome unpleasantness. Experiment 1 compared a serious disease 
trade-off decision with a job selection task used in prior research on preference 
construction. Experiment 2 compared decision-making between serious and mild disease 
treatment decisions differing in outcome severity, also including a physiological affect 
measure. In both experiments, choice was best predicted by a model including only affect 
towards alternatives within a decision context. Prediction was not improved by including 
outcome and attribute ratings independent of decision context, providing support for 
preference construction over revealed preferences. Coherence shifting of outcome affect 
and attribute importance ratings was fully or partially supported in all four tasks. Tasks 
ii 
with more severe outcomes or threatening higher-level goals (e.g., survival) produced 
more aversive feelings but did not lead to stronger coherence shifting. 
Keywords: affect heuristic, preference construction, decision-making, health 
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INTRODUCTION 
Shared decision making is an increasingly prominent paradigm in health care, 
including academic and medical research (Makoul & Clayman, 2006) and practical 
integration in large-scale government health programs (Elwyn et al., 2010). Elwyn et al. 
define shared decision making as “an approach where clinicians and patients share the 
best available evidence when faced with the task of making decisions, and where patients 
are supported to consider options, to achieve informed preferences” (p. 971). 
Communication tools known as decision aids have been developed for a variety of health 
contexts to aid clinicians and patients in shared decision-making scenarios (Stacey et al., 
2011). Health decisions that patients may face in shared decision making, such as 
choosing to modify a treatment for cancer, often involve weighing costs and benefits on a 
variety of dimensions such as out-of-pocket cost, toxicity (side effects), and efficacy 
(e.g., Wong et al., 2013; Stacey et al., 2011). These types of multi-attribute decisions are 
commonly studied in psychology, and there are many well-documented strategies and 
processes for choosing between alternatives. These often involve subjective appraisals of 
the attributes on which alternatives can be compared and the specific outcomes of the 
alternatives. Elwyn et al. (2012), for example, suggest that clinicians should ask patients 
what (attribute) is most important to them in order to guide them to a preference.  
There is no guarantee, however, that a patient’s subjective appraisals will be 
relevant towards their long-term goals or that they will base their decision on the 
maximum amount of evidence presented to them. This may be the case even when 




such as evaluative categories (Peters et al., 2009). To provide information in a manner 
that is useful and beneficial to patients, we must understand how participants arrive at 
preferences and how they use these preferences to reach a decision. Within the large field 
of decision-making, this dissertation will focus on the issue of revealed versus 
constructed preferences. Namely, do decisions reveal underlying preferences, or are 
preferences constructed in the context of that decision? 
Several authors have noted the important role of emotions in decision-making. In 
a review of health decision-making literature, Carpenter and Niedenthal (2017) provided 
a number of ways in which decision-making generates aversive feelings and how such 
feelings can guide or divert the decision-making process, and further proposed that the 
processes of generating preferences and controlling emotion are interlinked. In particular, 
they emphasize findings by Carpenter, Yates, Preston and Chen (2016) suggesting that 
difficult decisions produce aversive feelings and that the process of altering preferences 
across the course of decision-making to support a single alternative (e.g., Simon, 
Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 2004) serves to regulate these emotions. Alternatively, Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2004) and Bechara and Damasio (2005) suggest that 
emotions themselves are often the method by which a decision is reached, and several 
later studies suggest that choice is best predicted by emotion (Charpentier, De Neve, Li, 
Roiser, & Sharot, 2016; Schlösser, Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2013). It is also likely that 
health decisions will produce stronger negative emotions because they involve imagining 
visceral physical consequences that threaten higher-level goals like survival 




The goal of this research project is to examine the role of emotions in a complex, 
multi-attribute health decision trade-off. In particular, this project was focused on the 
following questions. Will people show higher aversive feelings and more negative affect 
towards decision aspects (e.g., outcomes and alternatives) when facing a more serious 
health-based decision? Does affect towards aspects of a decision predict choice of a 
medical treatment better than other models of decision making, including more 
cognitively costly ones? Will people faced with a health decision engage in the shifting of 
preferences to support their final decision, and will this shifting reduce aversive feelings 
arising from a difficult decision? Finally, does the decision context impact this shifting? 
In this dissertation, I explored these concepts using three difficult trade-off 
decision tasks in two experiments, manipulating the emotional salience and context of the 
tasks. In the first experiment, affect was measured across the course of decision making 
in a previously developed job-selection task and a newly developed shared-treatment 
decision scenario for a serious disease. The second experiment compared two novel 
shared-treatment decision scenarios of varying disease severity (serious and mild) with 
the addition of an objective physiological measure of affect. 
The Construction of Preferences 
The goal of presenting patients with as much evidence-based information as 
possible is to allow them to make an informed, rational decision about their health 
(Elwyn et al., 2012). One of the most comprehensive and cognitively difficult methods of 
decision-making, which is designed to use all possible evidence, is the weighted additive 




the importance of the attributes under comparison, and linearly multiply importance by 
utility before summing scores for each alternative. The alternative with the highest score 
would be selected. Simplified, qualitative versions of this method exist that account for 
the lack of ability of non-experts to give meaningful utility or importance ratings (Hastie 
& Dawes, 2010). Weighted additive effectively uses all information in difficult, 
conflicted decisions (where there is not one alternative that is superior on all outcomes) 
because positive outcomes on one or more attributes can compensate for negative 
outcomes on other attributes.  
Other, less cognitively intensive processes focus only on a single attribute. In 
lexicographic decision making, patients select the alternative with the best outcome on 
the most important attribute, such as picking the treatment with the highest survivability 
(Hastie & Dawes, 2010). Patients the using elimination by aspects strategy will reject any 
alternative with unacceptable outcomes on the most important alternative (e.g., rejecting 
all treatments with side effects that are too severe; Tversky, 1972). These two methods 
align with instructions for patients in shared decision making to think about what is most 
important to them, although a well-informed patient would have enough information to 
use a strategy like weighted additive (Elwyn et al., 2012). 
The ability of weighted additive and the other processes specifically mentioned 
above to consistently produce the maximum possible utility (or personal value) across 
many decisions, however, relies on the basis that people’s preferences about outcomes 
and attributes are invariant across both decision context and time. A preference in one 




Morgenstern, 1947). Research in the field of preference construction has brought this 
assumption into doubt. In one paradigm, Simon and colleagues (Simon, Pham, Le, & 
Holyoak, 2001; Simon et al., 2004) conducted a series of studies investigating dynamic 
preference construction, i.e., how people change underlying preferences until one 
alternative can meet their needs. Under this model, rather than accessing stable and 
invariant preferences and using them for a decision process in a conflicted decision, 
people alter (i.e., construct) their preferences prior to making a choice in order to make 
one alternative the most attractive. For an extreme judgement-based example, members 
of a jury given ambiguous evidence may alter the perceived strength of evidence for or 
against a crime based on a simple first impression of the defendant, continuing until the 
evidence for that initial leaning appears overwhelming and the evidence against it seems 
negligible (Simon, 2004). Simon et al. (2004) explain this process using connectionist 
constraint-satisfaction networks, suggesting that attributes and outcomes that are similar 
(i.e., are attractive for the same alternative) will receive increasing activation while 
outcomes supporting other alternatives are inhibited. This leads to altered preferences that 
are uniformly high for one alternative and uniformly low towards the others, thus 
strongly supporting a single alternative. Simon et al. refer to this process of changing 
preferences aligning over time in order to support a single alternative as coherence 
shifting. 
Simon et al. (2004) examined coherence shifting in difficult multi-attribute 
decisions using a job offer scenario, measuring preferences for alternatives and outcomes 




decision. Participants were first shown attributes (e.g., salary, commute) and specific 
outcomes (e.g., salary $600 below industry average, 18 minute commute) related to job 
offers but outside of the context of any specific job (pre-choice). Participants rated 
outcomes in terms of desirability and attributes in terms of importance. After a distractor 
task, participants were presented with two hypothetical job offers using four attributes 
and eight outcomes they had previously rated. This job decision was conflicted and 
represented a difficult trade-off, with each job superior on two attributes and inferior on 
the other two. Differences balanced to provide a similar overall utility, but a fifth attribute 
was manipulated to give one job or the other a small advantage. Participants were told to 
delay their decision due to a possible job offer retraction, but rated outcomes and 
alternatives a second time (mid-choice). Participants were then allowed to continue with 
their decision and provided final (post-choice) ratings. The authors found that participants 
significantly shifted their importance weights and outcome ratings between the pre-
choice and mid-choice measures such that they were more positive towards the winning 
traits of the offer they selected and more negative towards traits favoring the offer they 
had rejected. This suggests that preferences related to attributes and outcomes can change 
during the course of making a single decision and that the direction of these choices 
depends on the final choice, which Simon et al. refer to as coherence shifting. (These 
shifts are not permanent. Simon & Spiller (2016) found preferences returned to per-
choice levels within 6 weeks. Simon, Krawczyk, Bleicher, and Holyoak, (2008) found 





Emotions from Decision-Making 
Carpenter et al. (2016) believed making difficult, conflicted, multi-attribute 
decisions produces negative emotions, and that coherence shifting might serve as a 
process to regulate that emotion. The authors performed three conceptual replications of 
Simon et al. (2004). First, they found that increasing the level of conflict in a difficult 
multi-attribute decision (e.g., higher distance between outcomes on attributes, such as a 
larger difference in salaries) caused increasing aversive, negative feelings in participants. 
Second, they replicated the job offer task and three measurement times, but also included 
self-report measures of decision difficulty and a measure of physiological arousal (skin 
conductance response). Stronger shifting in preferences was associated with higher self-
reported ease of decision-making, and those who strongly shifted preferences were the 
only ones to show a reduction in physiological arousal between the mid- and post-choice 
measures. In the third experiment, a manipulation that reduced available cognitive 
resources resulted in less coherence shifting. This aligns with findings that emotional 
regulation is a cognitively intensive process that leads to depletion of cognitive control 
resources (Hobson, Saunders, Al-Khindi, & Inzlicht, 2014).  
Carpenter et al. (2016) took these findings as evidence that negative emotions 
arise from decisions in proportion to their difficulty (level of conflict between outcomes), 
and that coherence shifting serves to regulate these negative emotions. Coherence shifting 
reduces the perceived difficulty of the decision by making one option more attractive. 
This results in less internal conflict and decision difficulty than deciding based on stable, 




important in a health context because they can lead to biases or deficiencies in decision 
making. Kuykendall and Keating (1990) found that inducing a negative mood unrelated 
to a critical reasoning task (i.e., reading an unrelated unpleasant article) led to more 
systematic thinking, but in other studies negative affect was associated with reduced 
performance in perceptual decision tasks, a tendency to delay decisions, or (most 
importantly) a preference for less risky or threatening alternatives (Byrne, Peters, & 
Willis, 2018; Lerner & Kentner, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Luce, 1998).  
Importantly, Carpenter et al. (2016) did not address the context or specific content 
of the decision as a source of affect, merely the level of conflict. Taken alone, their 
theory would suggest similar levels of aversive emotions in an emotionally neutral 
shopping task or a serious health decision, as long as the level of conflict between 
alternatives (difficulty) is similar. Carpenter and Niedenthal (2017) later addressed this 
conflict as the primary source of decision-related emotion in their review on health 
decision-making, although they did suggest that emotional regulation from coherence 
shifting can also reduce long-term negative emotions that are common in patients facing 
health decisions.  
However, high conflict between outcomes is far from the only source of negative 
emotion in the health decision process. Luce (1998) defined decision “difficulty” as the 
extent to which the decision threatens higher-level goals, rather than differences in 
outcomes. In a consumer decision-making study, Luce presented participants with one of 
two numerically identical car buying tasks, changing the names of two attributes. These 




handling vs. Occupant (crash) survival), but attributes in one condition threatened higher-
level goals like safety or esteem. Luce found that decisions produced more general 
negative affect when attributes threatened higher-level goals, even if the attributes in 
question were rated of equal importance to the task. I am continuing Carpenter et al.’s 
research into coherence shifting and regulation of aversive feelings, but I expanded this 
research in Experiment 1 by using two decision scenarios that vary in the levels of goals 
threatened for participants (e.g., comfort in the job task vs. survival in the disease task).  
In addition to threatening important goals, descriptions of health decisions often 
involve physical symptoms or side effects that are viscerally imaginable and produce an 
immediate physiological response, both of which can have direct impact on negative 
emotion (Carpenter and Niedenthal, 2017; Loewenstein et al, 2001). This is related to 
Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis, which states that emotions in decision-making 
arise from bioregulatory neural processes that either come from or mimic physiological 
states in the body (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). The somatic marker hypothesis, however, 
goes beyond theories of how difficult decisions produce general negative emotions, 
suggesting that negative and positive affect are also mechanisms driving choice. In 
Experiment 2, I expanded on research by Carpenter et al. (2016) by using two tasks that 
both threaten higher-level goals but vary in the unpleasantness of their outcomes (i.e., 







Emotions as Decision-Making  
To explain the direct role of emotion in decision-making, Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, and MacGregor (2004) proposed a process known as the affect heuristic. This had 
its basis in early research on public risk perception, which showed that people evaluate 
public health risks based primarily on emotional dread of consequences and 
unfamiliarity, rather than quantitative or expert information (Slovic, 1987). Slovic and 
colleagues proposed that features of an object, location, or situation are automatically 
compared to affect-based markers in memory, leading to an immediate emotional 
reaction. These somatic markers are aspects of past experiences that are associated with 
physiological emotion-states and are used to judge current situations or alternatives 
(Bechara and Damasio, 2005). In decision-making, this immediate emotional reaction can 
alter perceptions and evaluations of outcomes or alternatives or even be the only driver of 
the decision-making process (e.g., avoiding alternatives evoking negative feelings and 
seeking those evoking positive feelings). The affect heuristic has the benefit of being an 
experience-based and low-effort process, but the disadvantage of discounting quantitative 
and non-emotional evidence. Also, it does not function well if relevant experience is not 
available (Slovic et al., 2004). Even if a more complex decision-making strategy is used, 
short-term affect that arises from imagining future outcomes is often what participants 
weigh when making decisions (Lowenstein et al., 2001). Peters (2006) suggests that even 
in cognitively intensive decision making, people may be unable to place value or utility 
on outcomes or meaningfully compare outcomes on different attributes if those outcomes 




These affective reactions may not be stable over time or decisions, being constructed 
from the combination of somatic markers that happen to be activated by the specific 
presentation of the alternative as a whole rather than being a simple additive combination 
of affect towards those outcomes (Bechara & Damasio; Slovic et al.). These affective 
responses are fast, temporary, and situation-specific and can be influenced by factors 
such as the particular alternatives presented, the order of information perceived, and 
decision-irrelevant affect or arousal (Kuykendall & Keating, 1990; Loewenstein et al.; 
Slovic et al.) . Thus, the affect heuristic may be another type of preference construction. 
(See the discussion of stochastic models below.)  
Some evidence of the direct predictive value of affect on decision-making has 
been found in the related field of probabilistic or risky decision-making. Charpentier et 
al. (2016) asked participants to rate their expected happiness or unhappiness upon 
hypothetically winning or losing various amounts of money, before exposing them to 
approximately 300 trials of a simulated decision between a sure option and a risky 50-50 
gamble using the monetary amounts rated. Participant’s choice of sure bets or gambles 
was best predicted by a model containing only emotions towards the monetary values in 
the outcomes. Adding additional terms to the model for probability of outcomes and 
framing effects (i.e. different weighting of losses versus gains, Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) did not improve this prediction. Note that Simon et al. (2004) asked participants to 
rate outcomes in the job offer task on a single-item scale of desirability, which is similar 
to this predicted happiness rating or a simple positive-negative (valence) affect scale 




Schlösser et al. (2013) conducted a series of similar studies involving real 
monetary rewards to evaluate the predictive ability of both overall affect towards 
alternatives (similar to the affect heuristic) and affect towards specific outcomes. Their 
studies replicated well-known gambling tasks and were arranged such that the expected 
utility of each alternative was identical, similar to a conflicted trade-off multi-attribute 
decision. Participants were asked to rate their feelings toward each future outcome of a 
choice (won, lost, would’ve won, or would’ve lost) as well as overall alternative-related 
emotion (sure bet and gamble) using a more complex multi-dimensional measure of 
emotion (i.e., pleasure, arousal, and dominance) before selecting an alternative. They 
found that outcome-related and alternative-related affect each individually improved 
prediction of choice to a significant extent, but the model with only alternative-based 
emotions was the most predictive. Alternative-based emotions mediated the relationship 
between outcome-based emotions and choice, but also had independent effects beyond 
mediation.  
This finding is conceptually similar to stochastic models of multi-attribute choice 
such the diffusion decision model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) and the leaky competing 
accumulator model (Usher & McClelland, 2001). According to these models, as people 
randomly sample attributes when comparing two alternatives, positive affect towards the 
best outcome on each attribute will increase activation towards one alternative and inhibit 
activation towards the other alternative. A decision is made when one alternative reaches 
some threshold of sufficient activation, whether or not all outcomes have been 




decision time that have been supported in repeated trials with simple choices (Ratcliff & 
McKoon).  
However, the diffusion decision and leaky competing accumulator models only 
describe one direction of activation flow, where outcomes provide activation and lateral 
inhibition towards alternatives. Examining activation in the other direction (alternatives 
to outcomes/attributes) as well as lateral connections between alternatives and outcomes 
could explain positive and negative changes in preferences during coherence shifting. If 
we also treat outcomes and attributes as nodes with changing activation, then any 
activation towards an alternative may also increase activation towards outcomes and 
attributes that support that alternative (leading to higher importance and utility ratings) 
and laterally inhibit outcomes and attributes that do not (leading to lower importance and 
utility ratings). Simon et al. (2004) used a constraint satisfaction network to model 
preference shifting. In these networks, there are bidirectional connections between 
outcomes and alternatives as well as lateral connections between outcomes and attributes 
(Hunt, 2002). There is some evidence for this direction of activation in an analogous 
public risk perception context. Alhakami and Slovic (1994) found that positive or 
negative affect towards a wide variety of technologies (e.g., nuclear power) affected 
participants’ subjective ratings of the risks and benefits (outcomes) of adopting those 
technologies.  
In two experiments, I examined both directions of influence by adapting past 
methods used to study coherence shifting (preference for an alternative towards 




attributes, and affect towards chosen alternative; Charpentier et al., 2016; Schlösser et 
al., 2013). Using both types of analyses allowed me to fill an important gap in both 
research programs. In addition, using a predictive analysis allowed me to test multiple 
decision strategies in order to identify what decision information best predicts choice in 
simulated shared treatment decisions. 
Summary of Decision Making 
In summary, there are multiple models of decision making that could be used to 
explain how patients handle difficult trade-offs in a shared decision context. Weighted 
additive is thought to generally lead to decisions that maximize utility (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947) and deals with difficult trade-offs by expending considerable 
cognitive effort to consider preferences towards all available information. Attribute-based 
models (lexicographic, elimination by aspects) simplify the decision by discarding all 
information not related to one or a few critical attributes. These specific models reflect 
what experts instruct patients to do in shared decision-making. Weighted additive and 
attribute-based models rely on the idea that as an alternative becomes more preferred 
during the decision process, the increased preference for the alternative does not feed 
back to influence preferences for outcomes or attributes. This means that patients’ 
preferences are stable over time and they will make decisions that optimally match their 
stable preferences in the long term. It is important to note that shared decision making 
advocates are not overly concerned with the assumption of stable preferences (Elwyn et 




In contrast, emotion or affect-based models of decision making assume that 
preferences for outcomes, attributes, and alternatives are constructed in the context of a 
single decision and can change during the decision process. The affect heuristic suggests 
that choice is influenced by a rapid affective judgement of each alternative as a whole 
based on the particular combination of somatic markers activated by the outcomes of that 
alternative, but only within the specific framing of that decision and at that particular 
time (Slovic et al.2004; Kuykendall & Keating, 1990), . This construction of preferences 
is in the forward direction, with an affect-based preference for one alternative or another 
being constructed from past experience of outcomes, although not through a purely 
mathematical combination of stable preferences. This theory has some support from 
empirical findings (Charpentier et al., 2016; Schlösser et al., 2013) and a basis in choice 
construction models such as the diffusion decision model and leaky competing 
accumulator theory (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001), This system 
is low-effort and experience-based, and although prone to bias, often leads to effective 
decisions (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Slovic et al., 2004). General (i.e., related to the 
decision as a whole) negative affect can arise from the level of conflict in a difficult 
trade-off (Carpenter et al., 2016), threats to closely held goals like survival (Luce, 1998), 
or viscerally unpleasant decision outcomes themselves (Slovic et al.). These aversive 
feelings can alter or disrupt the decision making process (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Luce, 
1998).  
Construction of preferences can also flow in the other direction. Under coherence 




change their subjective feelings towards outcomes and the importance of attributes such 
that the initially preferred treatment becomes more attractive and other alternatives 
become less attractive (Simon et al., 2004). Patients who display high coherence shifting 
reduce some of the negative affect or arousal arising from a difficult trade-off decision. 
Patients who do less coherence shifting do not reduce negative affect and report higher 
subjective effort required to reach a decision (Carpenter et al., 2016).  
Definitions of Affect in the Current Study 
Affect is usually defined as a short-term emotional state or mood. Affective 
reactions refer to specific short-term emotions that are evoked by some stimuli in the 
environment. Medical treatment decisions may lead to longer-term emotional distress, 
which can represent more debilitating states (Carpenter & Niedenthal, 2017). Due to the 
short duration and simulated nature of the current tasks, however, such long-term 
emotions were not examined.  
This leads to an important note about terminology. Throughout this project, 
separate terms are used to represent affect towards different aspects of a multi-attribute 
decision: Affect towards outcomes, feelings towards alternatives, and aversive feelings 
towards the decision as a whole. These are used for the purposes of clarity, to 
differentiate between the variables being measured. All of these descriptors are still 
meant to represent affect, or short-term emotional states or reactions. Another concern is 
the depth of affect measures. Schlösser et al. (2013) measured affect towards all 
outcomes and alternatives in their study on three dimensions: Positivity, Arousal, and 




substantial amount of variance (> 50%) in decision-making and preferences (Mehrabian, 
1995). They have also been found through factor analysis to contribute the majority of 
the variance in other, more specific measures of emotion. Affect positivity, or valence, is 
a simple positive or negative reaction, and is the kind typically discussed in public risk 
perception (Lerner & Kentner, 2001) risky decision-making (Charpentier et al., 2016), 
and activation-based decision models (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). The arousal dimension 
represents a level of activity or alertness and can lead to either avoiding or seeking an 
action depending on the associated positivity. Many outcomes in health decision are 
unpleasant, so avoidance is more likely (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio., 1996). 
Arousal is also the only affect dimension that can be reliably associated with 
physiological arousal measures, such as skin conductance (Figner & Murphy, 2011). 
Dominance represents a spectrum of perceived control over a situation versus feeling 
controlled by external influences (Mehrabian). Dominance is strongly related to health 
decision-making, as perceived control or self-efficacy is considered essential for adopting 
and maintaining health-promoting behaviors (Strecher, McEvoy DeVellis, Becker, & 
Rosenstock, 1986; Weinstein & Sandman, 2002).  Outside of these dimensions, 
Carpenter et al. (2016) included unpleasantness, stress, anxiety, and feeling conflicted to 
provide a broader measure of aversive feelings. 
Ideally, affect towards both alternatives and outcomes would be measured with a 
multifaceted measure, as was done by Schlösser et al. (2013). Unfortunately, the larger 
number of outcomes used in these coherence shifting tasks (8 vs. their 4) and the repeated 




makes this impractical. Charpentier et al. (2016) were able to find a reliable predictive 
relationship between affect and choice using one-dimensional positivity (happiness) 
measures. Thus, the following studies will include one-dimensional (positivity) affect 
ratings for constructs that must be measured repeatedly (outcomes), and multi-
dimensional measures of affect for more complex mediating affective responses (feelings 
towards alternatives) and those that are compared to physiological arousal (aversive 
feelings towards the decision as a whole).    
Purpose and Hypotheses 
This research project will examine the role of emotion and direction of preference 
change in difficult multi-attribute health trade-off decisions. Decisions will involve 
choosing between two disease treatments that are conflicted, with each treatment 
(alternative) having outcomes that are superior on some attributes and inferior on other 
attributes. The most important questions addressed in this research focus on the role of 
affect in the decision making process. The relationship between affect and choice was 
examined in two directions. The first is predictive, where affective reactions predict 
choice: 
Hypothesis 1: In Experiments 1 and 2, choice will best be predicted by a model 
including affect towards outcomes outside of the decision context (pre-choice) 
and feelings towards alternatives within the context of a decision (mid-choice) 
such that lower ratings of negative affect towards outcomes related to an 
alternative and less negative feelings towards an alternative will increase its 




models where choice is predicted only by affect towards outcomes, only by 
attribute importance (approximating Lexicographic/Elimination by Aspects), or 
by a linear combination of outcome affect and attribute importance (Weighted 
Additive). 
According to evidence from a related risky decision paradigm, models using 
simple positive/negative affect towards outcomes (Charpentier et al., 2016) and multi-
dimensional feelings about alternatives (Schlösser et al., 2013) are the most predictive of 
choice. These models are not improved by including additional rational factors like the 
probability of outcomes. This method, which is simpler than weighted additive, also 
aligns with the choice-construction models, where activation and inhibition towards 
alternatives come from the difference between outcomes rather than a focus on important 
attributes, e.g., Ratcliff & McKoon’s (2008) diffusion decision model. 
In contrast to the model above, if models relying on stable, revealed preferences 
are correct, then attribute importance ratings and affect towards outcomes measured 
independently of any specific alternatives or decision should be predictive of choice. For 
example, if affect is the mechanism underlying utility ratings, as suggested by Peters 
(2006), the weighted additive strategy suggests that choice will be predicted by a person’s 
outcome affect ratings multiplied by attribute importance, whereas Lexicographic choice 
should only be predicted by attribute importance and a positive or negative sign based on 
which alternative is “winning” on that attribute. 
These predictive analyses, which involve comparing affect-based models 




to investigate because previous studies of coherence shifting either manipulated outcome 
utilities to make one choice more attractive (Simon et al., 2004), did not conduct 
predictive analysis (Carpenter et al., 2016), or did not compare models that follow from 
different theories (Simon & Spiller, 2016). 
In addition to affect towards outcomes predicting choice, influence may occur in 
the opposite direction. Once an early preference for one specific treatment alternative 
emerges, preferences towards alternatives and outcomes should shift to support a final 
choice. 
Hypothesis 2: In Experiments 1 and 2, preferences towards decision information 
(outcome affect and attribute importance) will change during decision making 
based on time and final treatment choice in order to make the chosen alternative 
more attractive. I hypothesized a strong form of the coherence shifting, in which 
ratings of outcome affect for the chosen treatment will increase from before a 
decision to the middle of the decision, while ratings for the non-chosen treatment 
decrease over the same interval. Similarly, importance ratings for attributes 
favoring the chosen treatment will increase from before a decision to the middle 
of the decision, while attributes favoring the non-chosen treatment will decrease 
over the same interval.  
This hypothesis relies on a strong interpretation of coherence shifting, where the 
slope of the line showing change in affect—or importance ratings—over time is positive 
or negative depending on whether the outcomes come from—or the attributes favor—the 




coherence shifting, the slope of the line showing change in outcome affect ratings over 
time for the chosen treatment will be greater than the corresponding slope for the non-
chosen treatment. Similarly, the slope of the line showing change in importance ratings 
over time for attributes favoring the chosen treatment will be greater than the 
corresponding slope for attributes favoring the non-chosen treatment. 
This hypothesis holds that coherence shifting, as demonstrated with a job offer 
task (Carpenter et al., 2016; Simon et al., 2004; Simon et al., 2008; Simon & Spiller, 
2016), will also occur in health decision making tasks. To test whether this hypothesis fits 
the connectionist constraint-satisfaction model proposed by Simon et al., preferences 
must be measured at pre-, mid-, and post-decision times. This is important because if 
preferences were only shown to change between pre-decision and post-decision 
measures, that could be attributed to theoretical accounts of changes in preferences taking 
place after a decision, such as cognitive dissonance (Simon & Holyoak, 2002).  
If preference changes do not occur until the post-choice stage, this would not be 
compatible with coherence shifting as an emotional regulation function that occurs during 
the decision process. This proposed function and findings by Carpenter et al. (2016) 
suggest the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: In both experiments, as overall coherence shifting from the pre-
choice to mid-choice time increases, aversive feelings towards the decision as a 
whole will decrease. Also, as the extent of overall coherence shifting increases, 
the extent to which physiological arousal decreases will increase, particularly 




arousal decrease will show a dose-response relationship in Experiment 2 
(Abelson, 1995).    
Carpenter et al. (2016) found evidence that a difficult trade-off decision with 
relatively emotionally-neutral outcomes and attributes led to aversive feelings during the 
decision process. In an experiment using physiological arousal as an index of aversive 
feelings, they found that the pattern of arousal over time was dependent on the extent of 
coherence shifting engaged in by participants. Those who shifted their preferences 
strongly over time showed a reduction in physiological arousal between the mid- and 
post-decision times, whereas those who did less shifting of preferences did not reduce 
their arousal.  
Carpenter et al. found that aversive feelings arise from the level of conflict 
(distance between outcomes) within a decision but did not specify any difference based 
on the context or content (attributes, outcomes) of the decision. Given that health 
treatment decisions are likely to have higher aversive feelings from the decision context, 
this effect should be more pronounced in health decisions and should depend on the 
content of specific health decisions: 
Hypothesis 4: Tasks with attributes that threaten higher-level goals (Experiment 
1) and tasks with more severe physical outcomes (Experiment 2) will lead to 
stronger aversive feelings towards the overall decision and higher physiological 
arousal compared to tasks with less severe outcomes and which threaten lower-




Difficult health decisions differ from relatively emotionally-neutral tasks such as 
job selection in a number of ways that may affect emotional salience. Aversive feelings 
might arise from attributes that affect higher-level goals like safety and survival (Luce, 
1998), physical outcomes that are often visceral and easily imaginable, and outcomes that 
predict near-term physical discomfort or pain (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Loewenstein et 
al., 2001). These negative emotions are likely to increase with the severity of physical 
outcomes, such that a relatively mild health decision will be less pleasant than a neutral 
task such as job selection, and a serious health decision with severe consequences will be 
less pleasant than that. This should lead to stronger aversive feelings towards the overall 
decision in these scenarios and higher physiological arousal when presented with more 
emotionally salient tasks. Experiment 1 will compare two tasks that threaten lower- or 
higher-level goals and Experiment 2 will compare two tasks threatening the same high-
level goals but with different levels of outcome unpleasantness. 
Exploratory Analysis. In addition to negative emotion, it important to know if 
coherence shifting becomes more or less common as a decision becomes more serious 
and if the magnitude of coherence shifting changes as outcome emotional salience and 
the level of goals threatened increase. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict this based on 
available empirical evidence. Carpenter et al. (2016) found that people depleted of 
executive resources by a separate frustrating task showed lower coherence shifting, but 
these findings do not extend to the effect of feelings arising from the decision itself. 
Thus, how differences in disease seriousness influence coherence shifting was examined 




Carpenter et al. also found that coherence shifting correlated with existing 
measures of emotional regulation. This analysis was repeated in the interests of 
converging evidence. Additionally, increasing confidence that a person’s final decision 
was correct may be a mechanism by which coherence shifting reduces negative emotion. 
Final decision confidence and changes in confidence were examined for a relationship 
with coherence shifting. 
Overview of Experimental Studies. These hypotheses were investigated using 
two experiments. Experiment 1 expanded upon original research on coherence shifting by 
comparing an emotionally-neutral decision task (job offer selection) with an emotion-
laden health trade-off decision (a serious disease treatment decision) that threatened 
lower- and higher-level goals respectively. Experiment 2 utilized objective, physiological 
measures to examine changes in emotion during coherence shifting with two difficult 
health trade-offs differing in severity (unpleasantness) of outcomes. Both of these 
experiments required the creation of balanced, difficult, emotionally-salient health trade-





PILOT STUDY: TRADE-OFF DEVELOPMENT 
In order to simulate a difficult trade-off decision, it was necessary to create 
scenarios that included two alternatives with outcomes that were balanced on a number of 
attributes. Simon et al. (2004) accomplished this by creating two fictional companies, 
Bonnie’s Best and Splendor, selecting four attributes common to job selection, and 
providing outcomes that were better or worse for either company. The outcomes chosen 
were often objectively better or worse than some moderate value (e.g., industry average 
salary.) Some decision making studies describe these outcomes as conflicted or 
negatively correlated: Every outcome that is positive for one job is negative for the other, 
as can be seen in Table 1. 
Creating difficult health trade-off scenarios for the current project entailed 
additional challenges beyond those faced by Simon et al. (2004). This project examined 
bi-directional influences between preferences and choices, rather than solely focusing on 
choice affecting preferences. This means that participants must be free to choose either 
alternative using the same outcome information, but without overwhelmingly favoring 
one alternative. This required a more precise balancing of outcome favorability or utility 
between alternatives. In order to be a difficult trade-off decision, differences on attributes 
must be large enough to not be trivial (e.g., $5 vs. $7 co-pay would be trivial) while also 
avoiding individual outcomes that are so extreme that choice would be guided by them 
entirely (e.g., death as a side effect).  
It was also necessary to balance outcomes across multiple attributes. Health 




closely-held goals and have outcomes that are not easily comparable. Thus, even if two 
health treatments are moderately different on price and moderately different in 5-year 
survival rate, the individual outcomes on those measures must also be somehow 
comparable or one attribute will become irrelevant. One potential solution to this problem 
discussed by Peters (2006) is affect as common currency, or the idea that people can 
compare many dissimilar possible outcomes using their affective reaction to each 
outcome rather than any kind of quantitative or reflective process. Thus, the purpose of 
the pilot study was to determine outcomes of real medical treatments that provided 
approximately equal affective reactions. In order to create a tradeoff that is predictably 
difficult across participants, affect towards these outcomes must also be generally shared 
across individuals. 
In the pilot study, affect towards outcomes was assessed using a modified version 
of Thurstone’s (1928) method of equal-appearing intervals. The original purpose of this 
method was to quantify attitudes. To do this, Thurstone would identify a large number of 
qualitative, textual statements about a topic (e.g., religion), and then ask judges to sort the 
statements into numbered piles ranging from least favorable to most favorable towards 
the concept. Statements that were placed under a single number reliably by several judges 
could be assigned that number as a value, and statements corresponding to consecutive 
values could be used to construct a ranked scale. A person could then give yes/no 
agreement to items on this scale, and the numerical values of their “Yes” items could be 






The goal of this pilot was to develop two difficult multi-attribute health treatment 
trade-off decisions, similar to the job offer task developed by Simon et al. (2004). These 
include treatments for a mild disease with visceral but moderate negative outcomes and 
treatments for a serious disease with severe negative outcomes. First, I identified real 
diseases that can lead to difficult trade-off decisions, including Type 1 diabetes, Crohn’s 
disease, and malignant melanoma. Information about treatments and symptoms for these 
diseases was collected from reputable online sources and medical literature (Tiziani, 
2017). Next, information about these treatments was separated from original sources into 
lists of outcomes for six attributes: side effects, administration method, out-of-pocket 
cost, duration of symptoms, efficacy, and mortality.  
Participants. Participants included 62 Clemson University students (age M = 19; 
87% female) recruited through Clemson’s undergraduate psychology research system. 
Participants were treated in accordance with APA ethical guidelines. 
Procedures. Participants completed six online card sort procedures following 
Thurstone’s procedure with a separate card sort for each attribute. They sorted a list of 
outcomes based on either their immediate emotional reaction (for side effects) or how 
unpleasant it would be to experience them (for all other scales), placing all outcomes in 
categories ranging from 1 “Not at all unpleasant” to 7 “Most unpleasant.” Participants 
then provided importance ratings for each of the six attributes towards any treatment 






Following guidelines provided by Thurstone (1928), outcomes were sorted 
according to their median affect value to find outcomes that represent a similar amount of 
unpleasantness. The other criterion for selecting outcomes was that the unpleasantness 
ratings showed relatively low variability, as outcomes with high variability in affect 
ratings would not generalize well to the experimental studies. Attributes were selected as 
follows. Attribute importance ratings on a 1 to 5 scale were highest for mortality (M = 
4.71, SD = 0.64), followed by efficacy (M=4.29, SD=0.69), out-of-pocket costs (M=3.97, 
SD=0.94), side effects (M=3.65, SD=0.83), duration of symptoms (M=3.52, SD=0.84), 
and administration (M=2.94, SD=0.92). Given the higher importance of mortality rates 
versus other attributes and the subjective perceptions described below, mortality 
outcomes were discarded. 
To construct a trade-off decision with sufficient differences between alternatives, 
outcomes with equivalent affect ratings were grouped, and then outcome groups 2 to 3 
affect units apart were compared side-by-side. Based on this initial comparison, a serious 
disease treatment decision with serious outcomes was constructed using outcomes with 
low variability that had been rated 4 or 6 on unpleasantness (2 units apart). A mild 
disease treatment decision was constructed using outcomes rated 2 and 4 on 
unpleasantness (2 units). The tradeoffs for mild and serious disease are presented in 





The scenarios presented to participants included a longer textual explanation of 




Table 1: Difficult job offer trade-off. Reproduced from Simon et al., 2004, with salary 
values adjusted from Simon & Spiller (2016). (+) and (-) indicate favorable and 
unfavorable outcomes. Participants did not see these symbols. 
 
 Splendor Bonnie's Best 
Salary (Industry average = 
$50,000) 
$49,2500 (-) $51,000 (+) 
Office Private office (+) Noisy cubicle (-) 
Vacation Package 2 weeks (-) 2 weeks plus retreat (+) 






Table 2: Treatment attributes and outcomes for a mild disease with moderate 
consequences. Median unpleasantness scores (“Unpleas.” ,interquartile range in 
parentheses) are shown to the left (Treatment T) or right (Treatment N) of each outcome. 




(IQR) Treatment T Treatment N 
Unpleas. 
(IQR) 
Administration method 2 (1) One pill 3 times a 
day for 14 days 
One intramuscular 
shot, then one pill 2 
times a day for 7 days 
4 (2) 
Side effects 4(1) Nausea Chills 2 (0.25) 
Efficacy (% of people 
cured of disease 1 week 
after treatment ends) 
2 (1) 87% 63% 4 (1) 
Duration of Symptoms 
(How long you'll feel 
disease symptoms.) 






Table 3: Treatment attributes and outcomes for a serious disease with severe 
consequences. Median unpleasantness scores (Unpleas., interquartile range in 
parentheses) are shown to the left (Treatment K) or right (Treatment M) of each outcome. 
Participants did not see these scores. Higher numbers are more unpleasant. 
  
Unpleas. 
(IQR) Treatment K Treatment M 
Unpleas. 
(IQR) 
Administration method 4 (2) One intramuscular 
shot, then one pill 2 
times a day for 7 days 
One injection 
into the spinal 
fluid 
6 (2) 
Side effects 6 (1) Seizure (50% chance) Nausea (50% 
chance) 
4 (1) 
Efficacy (% of people 
cured of disease 1 week 
after treatment ends) 
4 (1.25) 67% 51% 6 (1) 
Duration of Symptoms 
(How long you'll feel 
disease symptoms.) 









EXPERIMENT 1: EMOTIONALLY NEURTRAL VERSUS MEDICAL 
TREATMENT DECISIONS 
Experiment 1 examined participant decision-making in both a relatively 
emotionally-neutral tradeoff decision (job offer selection) adapted from Simon et al. 
(2004) and a medical treatment tradeoff decision threatening higher-level goals and with 
more emotionally laden outcomes (treatments for a serious disease). These two tasks 
were selected to produce strong differences in negative affect from decision information 
(outcomes, attributes) between tasks. This experiment had three purposes. The first was 
to examine the predictive validity of affect on final choice in both tasks. The second was 
to determine if coherence shifting occurs in both a replication of the original task used for 
this research as well as a novel medical treatment decision. Third, the two tasks were 
compared on subjective measures of aversive feelings from the decision and for the 
magnitude of coherence shifting which had occurred. Participants completed both tasks to 
allow for individual (within-subjects) comparisons in decision-making.   
Method 
Participants. A statistical power analysis was performed for sample size 
estimation using data from Simon’s et al. (2004) second job offer experiment, using the 
critical choice-by-time interaction (r = .404). With an alpha = .05 and power = 0.80, the 
projected sample size needed to reproduce this interaction effect size (GPower 3.1.9.2) 
was N = 83. For logistic regression, a minimum sample of N = 140 would be required for 
the most complex proposed model (weighted additive; Vittinghoff & MuCulloch, 2007, 




Participants included 125 Clemson University psychology students (Age: M = 
19.05, SD = 1.41, 60.8% female). Participants were treated according to APA ethical 
guidelines under the supervision of Clemson University’s Institutional Review Board.  
Design. The overall experiment followed a 2 (decision task: job offer, serious 
disease treatment) by 3 (measurement time: pre-choice, mid-choice, post-choice) within-
subjects design, although analysis focused on pre- and mid-choice times. Final choice 
between alternatives for each decision task (Serious disease: Treatment K or M; Job 
offer: Bonnie’s Best vs. Splendor) was dichotomous and was used as a between-subjects 
predictor variable or a criterion depending upon the analysis. Analysis for each decision 
task was conducted separately. The use of different attributes and outcomes between 
tasks and the number of dependent variables would make meaningful direct comparisons 
of shifting in preferences over time difficult. 
Dependent variables measured at all three time points included affect towards 
outcomes (8 per task) and subjective attribute importance (4 per task). Other dependent 
variables included mid-choice feelings towards alternatives (valence, arousal, and 
dominance toward each alternative), aversive feelings from the decision as a whole (4 
items), and final choice for each task. These were measured at (or shortly after, for final 
choice) the mid-choice time period. (A mid-choice initial leaning and confidence for both 
leaning and final choice were also recorded.) 
Measures. Affect (valence) towards outcomes was rated on a 10-point scale of 
predicted happiness ranging from -5 (“Extremely unhappy”) to +5 (“Extremely happy”), 




(Carpenter et al., 2016; Simon et al., 2004) with the direct measure of affect used by 
Charpentier et al. (2016). Desirability is conceptually strongly related to affect towards an 
object and can directly influence behavior in a similar manner (Peters, 2006). Subjective 
attribute importance was measured using a 9-point scale of importance ranging from 1 
(“no weight”) to 9 (“maximum weight”) (Simon et al.).  
Feelings towards alternatives were measured using a short, 3-item Self-
Assessment Manikin developed by Lang (1980) and Bradley and Lang (1994). The Self-
Assessment Manikin is a rapid self-report assessment of three dimensions of affect: 
positivity (valence), arousal, and dominance. Each dimension was rated on a 9-point 
pictorial semantic-differential scale, where participants selected one of the 5 images or 
the 4 midpoints between the images for an intermediate value (See Figure 1). Following 
Schlösser et al. (2013), I reversed the Positivity dimension images so that “desirable” 






Figure 1. The Self-Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994). This is used to rate affective reaction 
dimensions of Positivity (top panel), Arousal (middle panel) and Dominance (bottom panel). The Positivity 
scale has been reversed from Bradley and Lang. 
 
Aversive feelings towards the decision (affect) were measured with an averseness 
index utilized by Carpenter et al. (2016), including four 9-point scales using the terms 
Anxious, Stressed, Unpleasant, and Conflicted. These ranged from 1 (“Not at all 
anxious”) to 5 (“Moderately Anxious”) to 9 (“Extremely anxious”), except substituting 
the other emotions for “Anxious” in their scales. Final choice was a dichotomous 




Ratings of outcome affect ratings and attribute importance were collected at all 
three time points. Feelings towards alternatives and aversive feelings towards the 
decision were only collected at the mid-choice time. Final choice was collected between 
the mid-choice and post-choice ratings. For more details on timing, see the procedures. 
Participants also completed several demographic and control questions that may 
impact emotions towards outcomes or alternatives. These included direct or close 
personal experience with the disease used in the serious disease task, as prior experience 
should increase the strength of affective response (Slovic et al., 2004; Bechara and 
Damasio, 2005). Fear of injection was assessed using a single-item measure adapted from 
the Marks & Matthews (1979), as the health decision task involved injections. 
Participants also reported their health insurance status, as Wong et al. (2013) found that 
cancer patients prioritize monetary cost over survival (and vice versa) depending on 
insurance availability and income. Participants completed two existing measures of 
emotional regulation strategy: the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & 
John 2003) and the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ; Gross & John, 1998). 
Both of these scales use a 7-point Likert scale of agreement. The ERQ consists of 10 
statements about how a participant controls their emotions and is divided into two 
subscales; Cognitive Reappraisal (e.g., “I control my emotions by changing the way I 
think about the situation I’m in.”) and Expressive Suppression (e.g., “I control my 
emotions by not expressing them.”). The BEQ consists of 20 items assessing the extent to 
which the participant expresses positive emotion (Positive Expressivity) and negative 




(Impulse Strength). The BEQ was calculated as three separate subscales as well as an 
overall expressivity score.  
Procedure. Experimental sessions took place a laboratory with 1 to 4 
participants. All stimuli were presented through MediaLab (v2012). Participants 
completed both the job offer task and the serious disease task in a single session, and 
were randomly assigned to complete either the job offer or disease task first. Participants 
completed a practice Self-Assessment Manikin scale before the first task. 
Job Task. The job offer task was adapted from Simon et al. (2004). During the 
first, pre-choice phase of the task, participants were presented with information entitled 
“Waiting for a Job Offer,” where participants were asked to imagine that they are about 
to gradate and will be interviewing for a job. They were presented with 11 possible 
outcomes of job offers and rated each one in terms of their predicted happiness or 
unhappiness upon choosing it, i.e., outcome affect ratings. These included the 8 outcomes 
used in Table 1 plus 3 distractor outcomes, in list form. Participants were then presented 
with the four attributes available in Table 1 and asked to rate their importance in possible 
job offers, i.e., attribute importance ratings. These 12 measures were pre-choice ratings, 
outside of any decision context. No alternatives or decision matrix were present at this 
time.  
During the second, mid-choice phase, participants were presented with job offers 
from two large fictional retail-store chains, Splendor and Bonnie’s Best, using the 
decision information available in Table 1. These jobs were described as similar in all 




presented in both paragraph and matrix form (as in Table 1), with explanations of each 
outcome in the paragraphs. After being told to consider all aspects of the job offers, 
participants were instructed that a third company is considering buying one company or 
the other, so they were not able to choose between jobs until later. Participants then rated 
their predicted affect towards the 8 outcomes and provided importance weights for the 4 
attributes. For each job offer, participants were asked to imagine how they would feel if 
they selected that job and rate those feelings by completing a Self-Assessment Manikin. 
After this, they were be instructed to keep the two job offers in mind and complete the 
four-item index of aversive feelings towards the decision, as used in Carpenter et al., 
(2016).  
Following this was the final choice and third, post-choice phase. Participants were 
instructed that the third company would not buy either of the companies in the decision, 
and that they should continue with the choice. Participants were shown the job offer 
information again and chose a job offer. Participants rated their affect towards the 8 
outcomes and importance weights for the four attributes. 
Serious Disease Task. Timing and measures for the serious disease task were the 
same as for the job offer task. The structure of disease task was adapted from the job 
offer task used by Simon et al. (2004). The pre-choice information for the serious disease 
task asked participants to imagine that they had been diagnosed with a strain of malaria 
after a mosquito bite and that a doctor would soon be with them to talk about treatment 
options. Malaria was selected from diseases rated in the pilot due to some participants not 
knowing of more common diseases (e.g., MRSA, tetanus). Participants then provided 
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ratings for the 8 outcomes and four attributes in Table 3, as well as three distractor 
outcomes selected from moderately unpleasant pilot items. Participants were presented 
with the treatments from Table 3 in both paragraph and matrix form, along with 
instructions that they were being asked to take part in the decision process (a shared 
decision) due to the trade-offs in costs and benefits of the two treatments. This included a 
delay instruction stating that the participants would have to wait to decide because the 
doctor was still waiting for laboratory bloodwork that could prevent them from taking 
one or both treatments. The participants then completed mid-choice measures. At the 
choice and post-choice times, participants were instructed that the blood tests were ready 
and that both treatments were still available, and then selected a treatment and provided 
and post-choice ratings. 
Participants completed demographic and external influence measures after 
completing both tasks. Participants were fully debriefed including instructions that all 
treatments discussed were fictional before being released. 
Past research (Simon et al., 2008; Carpenter et al., 2016) included unrelated 
reasoning tasks between each measurement time as distractors in order to reduce memory 
for previous ratings. Such distractors were omitted from Experiment 1 in both tasks due 
to a software error, but were implemented in Experiment 2. 
Results 
Statistics. Generalized eta-squared was used for MANOVA and ANOVA effect 
sizes, as partial eta-squared may overestimate effect sizes in repeated-measures designs 
(Bakeman, 2005). According to Cohen’s (1988, p. 286) conventions for ηG2, 0.26 and 
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above represents a large effect, 0.13 is a medium effect, 0.02 is a small effect, and less 
than 0.02 is negligible. Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973) was used for 
predictive model fit as described below. Lower AIC indicates better fit. Using 
conventions from Burnham and Anderson (2004), models which have a fit within 2 AIC 
of the best-fitting model have substantial support, while models more than 10 AIC below 
the best-fitting model have essentially no support. 
Predicting Choice: Serious Disease Task (Experiment 1).  A separate 
predictive analysis was conducted on each task. Seven participants were eliminated from 
predictive analysis for the serious disease task as multivariate outliers on all predictor and 
outcome variables, resulting in a sample size for the disease task of N = 119. Treatment K 
was chosen by 77 participants (64.7%), and Treatment M was chosen by 42 participants 
(35.3%). Hypothesis 1 predicted that a model including pre-choice affect towards 
outcomes and mid-choice feelings towards alternatives would be the best predictor of 
choice (Model 2.1 in Table 4), when compared to other models based on outcome affect 
alone (1.0), attribute importance alone (3.0), or a linear combination of outcome affect 
and the related attribute importance (3.1, 4.0, 4.1). Multiple logistic regression analyses 
were conducted for several models to examine the predictive ability of different decision-
making models for this task. See Appendix B for full model descriptions. Model omnibus 
statistical tests, effect sizes, and fit information for the serious disease tasks are available 
in Table 5. Models were evaluated individually rather than in a stepwise logistic 
regression because, due to the selection of predictors from multiple decision strategies, 
not all models were nested. Models that significantly predicted choice were Model 2.0 
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(Mid-choice feelings towards alternatives; χ2 (6) = 90.39, p < .001), Model 2.1 (Mid-
choice feelings and pre-choice outcome affect; χ2 (14) = 107.41, p < .001), Model 3.1 
(Lexicographic; χ2 (2) = 19.65, p < .001), and Model 4.1 (Weighted additive with 
interaction; χ2 (6) = 33.85, p = .027). No other models significantly predicted choice.  
Models were compared for fit using AIC (Cohen et al., 2003). AIC approximates 
variance accounted for but favors more parsimonious models, with lower AIC values 
indicating better fit (Akaike, 1973). Model 2.1, including pre-choice affect towards 
outcomes and mid-choice feelings for alternatives, showed the best fit (AIC = 76.24). 
Models that are within 2 AIC of the best-fitting model are also considered to have 
substantial support. Model 2.0 (AIC = 77.26), containing only mid-choice feelings, is 
equally predictive of choice. No other models provide substantial fit. This only partially 
supported Hypothesis 1, which predicted that pre-choice affect with mid-choice feelings 
(Model 2.1) would out-predict mid-choice feelings alone (Model 2.0). 
Regression coefficients and odds ratios for predictors in the serious disease task 
are presented in Appendix C (Tables C1.1 to C1.3). In both models 2.0 and 2.1, all six 
mid-choice ratings of feelings towards alternatives (positivity, arousal, and dominance) 
significantly predicted choice. Positivity most strongly predicted choice. In Model 2.1, 
participant became 7.53 times more likely to choose Treatment K for every 1 point 
increase in positivity towards K and became 4.55 (1/0.22) times more likely to choose 
Treatment M for every 1 point increase in positivity towards M. In model 2.1, pre-choice 
affect towards spinal injections (Treatment M administration) and 10 days without 
hospitalization (Treatment M duration) also significantly predicted choice. For every 1 
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point increase in affect towards spinal injections, participants became 1.77 times more 
likely to choose Treatment K. For every 1 point increase in affect towards 10 days 
without hospitalization, participants became 1.67 (1/0.60) times more likely to choose 
Treatment M.  
Predicting Choice: Job Task. Thirteen participants were eliminated from 
predictive analysis for the job task as multivariate outliers, resulting in a sample size for 
the job task of N = 112. Only one participant was an outlier on both the serious disease 
and job tasks. Splendor was chosen by 70 participants (62.5%) and Bonnie’s Best was 
chosen by 42 participants (37.5%). Model omnibus statistical tests, effect size, and fit 
information for the job task are available in Table 6. All models significantly predicted 
choice (p < .01) except for Models 3.0 (Attribute importance) and Model 3.1 
(Lexicographic). Model 2.0, including only mid-choice feelings towards alternative, was 
the best-fitting model (AIC = 63.15). This only partially supports Hypothesis 1, which 
predicted that pre-choice affect ratings would improve prediction above mid-choice 
feelings, as in Model 2.1. Based on comparison of AIC, no other models provide 
substantial fit. Regression coefficients and odds ratios for predictors in the job-choice 
task are presented in Appendix C, Tables C2.1 to C2.3. In model 2.0, all six mid-choice 
ratings of feelings towards alternatives (positivity, arousal, and dominance) significantly 
predicted job choice. Positivity most strongly predicted choice. In this model, participants 
became 4.14 times more likely to choose Splendor for every 1 point increase in positivity 
towards Splendor. Participants became 2.63 (1/0.38) times more likely to choose 
Bonnie’s Best for every 1 point increase in positivity towards Bonnie’s Best.  
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Table 4: Schematic versions of theory-based models and parameters.  Hypothesis 2 states 
that Model 2.1 would be the most predictive of choice. 
Model Predictors Critical Parameters 
1.0: Affect: 
Charpentier et al. 
Affect for 8 outcomes 
(alternatives A and B each 
have 4 outcomes) 
β1-8(Affect A1-4, B1-4) 
2.0: Mid-choice 
feelings only 
Feelings for alternative A 
+ feelings for alternative B
β1PosA + β2ArousalA + β3DomA 
+ β4PosB + β5ArousalB + β6DomB
2.1: Affect: 
Schlösser et al. 
Affect for 8 outcomes 
+ feelings for alternative A
+ feelings for alternative B
β1-8(Affect A1-4, B1-4) 
+ β9PosA + β10ArousalA + β11DomA
+ β12PosB + β13ArousalB + β14DomB
3.0: Attribute-based Importance for 4 attributes  β1-4 (ImpAttribute1-4) 
3.1: Lexicographic Affect for 2 outcomes on high-
importance attribute 
β1 (AffectA,most imp.) + β2 (AffectB,most imp.) 
4.0:  W.Add (Main 
effects) 
 Affect for 8 outcomes 
+ Importance for 4 attributes
β1-8(Affect A1-4, B1-4) 
+ β9-12(ImpAttribute1-4)
4.1 : W.Add 
(Interaction)* 
 Affect for 8 outcomes 
+ Importance for 4 attributes
+ Affect x Importance for A
+ Affect x Importance for B
β1-8(Affect A1-4, B1-4) 
+ β9-12(ImpAttribute1-4)
+ β13-16((Affect A1-4) x (ImpAttribute1-4))
+ β17-20((AffectB1-4) x (ImpAttribute1-4))
See Appendix B for a detailed explanation of models. Pos = positivity, Dom = dominance, and Imp = 
importance. * Interaction is only between the outcome and its corresponding attribute (e.g., 
ImportAttribute1(Side effects) x AffectA1(Seizure), ImportAttribute2 x AffectA2, etc.). most imp. = most important 
attribute. W.Add = Weighted Additive. 
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Table 5: Model statistical tests and fit for the Study 1 Serious Disease task. 
 Model 
Log 




R2 adjusted AIC 
0 Null -76.82 - - 0 0 161.8 
1.0 Affect (Charpentier) -71.62 10.42 (8) 0.237 0.0678 -0.036 161.23 
2.0 Affect (Mid-choice) -31.63 90.39** (6) < .001 0.588 0.510 77.26 
2.1 Affect (Schlösser) -23.12 107.40 **(14) < .001 0.699 0.517 76.24 
3.0 Attribute-based -72.57 8.52 (4) 0.074 0.055 0.003 155.13 
3.1 Lexicographic -67.00 19.65 **(2) < .001 0.128 0.102 140.00 
4.0 W.Add (Main effects) -68.30 17.05 (12) 0.148 0.111 -0.045 162.60 
4.1 W.Add (Interaction) -59.90 33.85* (20) 0.027 0.220 -0.040 161.80 
N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. W.Add = Weighted Additive. 
Table 6: Predictive model statistical tests and fit for the Study 1 Job task. 
Model 
Log 




R2 adjusted AIC 
0 Null -74.10 - - 0.000 0.000 150.19 
1.0 Affect (Charpentier) -61.58 25.02* (8) 0.002 0.169 0.061 141.17 
2.0 Affect (Mid-choice) -42.52 63.15** (6) < .001 0.426 0.345 99.05 
2.1 Affect (Schlösser) -37.92 72.36 **(14) < .001 0.488 0.299 105.83 
3.0 Attribute-based -72.84 2.51 (2) 0.285 0.017 -0.010 151.68 
3.1 Lexicographic -71.52 5.16 (4) 0.271 0.035 -0.019 153.03 
4.0 W.Add (Main effects) -58.84 30.52* (12) 0.002 0.206 0.044 143.67 
4.1 W.Add (Interaction) -51.83 44.52* (20) 0.001 0.300 0.031 145.67 
N = 112. * p < .05, ** p < .001. AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. W.Add = Weighted 
Additive. 
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Coherence Shifting: Serious Disease Task (Experiment 1).  
Serious Disease: Importance. Mean comparisons for coherence shifting were also 
conducted separately for each task. The strong form of the coherence shifting Hypothesis 
(#2) predicted that attributes favoring the chosen treatment increase from before the 
decision to the middle of the decision, while attributes favoring the non-chosen treatment 
would decrease over the same interval. The general coherence shifting hypothesis only 
predicted a slope difference for the change in ratings over time rather than a positive vs. 
negative slope. These analyses did not include the post-decision data because changes 
between pre- and mid-choice times must be present if changes in scores are caused by 
coherence shifting, as opposed to cognitive dissonance. 
In the context of the two treatments in the serious disease decision task, if the strong 
form of coherence shifting occurs, these changes should follow opposite patterns as 
follows. Participants who selected K should increase their importance ratings for 
attributes favoring K (Administration method, Efficacy) between the pre- and the mid-
choice periods and decrease their importance ratings for attributes favoring M (Side 
effects, Duration) over the same interval. In contrast, participants who selected M should 
decrease their importance ratings for attributes favoring K between the pre- and the mid-
choice periods and increase their importance ratings for attributes favoring M over the 
same interval. 
To test these predictions, importance ratings were examined using a 2 (Treatment 
chosen: K or M; between subjects) by 2 (Alternative Favored: K or M; within subjects) 
by 2 (Time: pre- or mid-choice; within subjects) mixed-model MANOVA with 
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importance ratings paired as favoring K or M as the 2 dependent variables. A significant 
3-way choice-by-favored-by-time interaction with importance scores shifting to make the
chosen alternative more attractive would provide support for the general form of 
coherence shifting under Hypothesis 2. The strong form of coherence shifting would be 
supported if these changes follow the pattern described above. 
Six participants were identified as multivariate outliers on serious disease 
importance scores and were removed from analysis, resulting in a sample of 119. 
Treatment K was chosen by 77 of these participants (64.7%) and M was chosen by 42 
(35.3%). Full MANOVA results are available in Appendix D (Table D1.1). Figure 2 
shows the data relevant to the coherence shifting hypothesis. M choosers appear to have 
shown the strong form of coherence shifting, while K choosers appear to show no 
coherence shifting, as the slopes of the time-change lines are parallel. In the omnibus 
multivariate test, the 3-way interaction of choice, time and whether attributes favor K or 
M was significant (Pillai’s = .066, F(2,116) = 4.11, p = .016, ηG2 =0.016), with a 
negligible effect on importance. This supports the general form of the coherence shifting 
hypothesis. (Other significant main effects and interactions were found, as shown in 
Appendix D.) 
Given the different patterns for choosers of K vs. M, separate within-subjects 2 by 
2 (time by treatment favored) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted for these 
groups. A significant treatment-favored by time interaction supported the strong form of 
coherence shifting for M choosers (F (1, 41) = 5.40, p = 0.025, ηG2 =0.062), a small effect. 
This interaction was not significant for K choosers (F (1, 76) = 2.12, p = 0.150 ηG2 
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=0.014), which provides no support for coherence shifting. See Table D1.2 for full 
ANOVA results. Thus, coherence shifting was supported for K choosers but not for M 
choosers.  
In summary, the omnibus 3-way interaction was significant but showed a 
negligible effect size. Also, coherence shifting was found only for K choosers. Thus, the 
evidence for coherence shifting regarding importance scores is weak. 
Figure 2.. Study 1 average serious disease attribute importance ratings favoring K or M by choice and time. 
M choosers (2b) altered their importance ratings between the pre- and mid-choice times showing the strong 
form of coherence shifting. K choosers (2a) did not shift scores. Error bars = 2SE. 
Serious Disease: Affect. The strong form of coherence shifting predicted that 
affect towards outcomes of the chosen treatment would increase from before the decision 
to the middle of the decision, while affect towards outcomes of the non-chosen treatment 
would decrease over the same interval. Furthermore, for participants who chose K, affect 
towards treatment K outcomes should increase and affect towards treatment M outcomes 
should decrease between pre- and mid-choice ratings. In contrast, for those choosing M, 
affect towards M outcomes should increase and affect for K outcomes should decrease in 
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the same interval. To test for coherence shifting, affect ratings were examined using a 2 
(Treatment chosen: K or M; between subjects) by 2 (Outcome Treatment: K or M; within 
subjects) by 2 (Time: pre- or mid-choice; within subjects) mixed-model MANOVA with 
outcome ratings on each attribute as the 4 dependent variables. A significant choice-by-
treatment-by-time interaction in a direction that made the chosen alternative more 
attractive would provide support for coherence shifting.   
One participant was identified as a multivariate outlier in all affect dependent 
variables, resulting in a sample of 124. Of these, 81 chose Treatment K (65.3%) and 42 
chose M (34.7%). Figure 3 shows the data relevant to the coherence shifting hypothesis. 
Although the data do not support the strong form of coherence shifting, they seem 
consistent with the general form in which affect ratings for outcomes of the chosen 
treatment increase from pre- to mid-choice more than ratings for outcomes of the non-
chosen treatment. The predicted choice by outcome treatment by time interaction was 
significant. (Pillai’s = .089, F(4,119) = 2.89, p = 0.023, ηG2 = 0.023), showing a small 
effect on affect ratings. Thus, the outcome affect ratings supported the general form of 
coherence shifting. 
The MANOVA also showed that outcome affect ratings increased significantly 
from before (M = -1.86, SD =1.17) to in the middle of the decision (M = -1.30, SD = 
1.08), (Pillai’s = 0.819, F(4,119) = 134.81, p = <.001, ηG2 =.0.513), with a very large 
effect size. Figure 3 shows that all outcomes were rated negatively, which makes sense 
given that these outcomes were selected to be highly unpleasant. This main effect means 
that participants optimistically rated outcomes as less unpleasant in the decision context 
49
than in the de-contextualized situation before the decision. This could explain why the 
data supported the general but not the strong form of coherence shifting. Other significant 
main effects and interactions were found, as shown in Appendix D (Tables D2.1 and 
D2.2).  
Figure 3.. Study 1 average serious disease outcome affect ratings by choice and time.Both types of choosers 
generally increased their affect scores between the pre- and mid-choice times, but sharper increases 
occurred for outcomes of the chosen treatment. All sub-figures are in the same scale. Error bars = 2SE. 
Four univariate ANOVAs with the same independent variables showed that the 
predicted choice by outcome treatment by time interaction was only significant for 
Duration of symptoms (F(1,122) =9.20, p = 0.003, ηG2 = 0.015), a negligible effect size. 
Duration followed the pattern expected with general coherence shifting, with scores 
increasing over time but with steeper increases for the chosen treatment.  
In summary, the general form of coherence shifting was supported for affect towards 
outcomes and showed a small effect size. The strong form of the prediction in Hypothesis 
2 was not supported. 
Coherence Shifting: Job Task.  
Job task: Importance. Similar to the serious disease task, the strong version of 
coherence shifting would be supported in the Job Task if those choosing Splendor rated 
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attributes favoring Splendor (Office, Commute) as more important and attributes favoring 
Bonnie’s Best (Salary, Vacation) as less important between the pre- and mid-choice 
times. Bonnie’s Best choosers should show the opposite importance changes. Importance 
ratings were examined using a 2 by 2 by 2 (final choice by job favored by time) mixed-
model MANOVA with the importance ratings grouped by job favored as the 2 dependent 
variables. Seven participants were identified as multivariate outliers on importance 
scores, resulting in a sample of 118. Of these, 75 chose Splendor (65.2%) and 43 chose 
Bonnie’s Best (34.8%). Figure 5 shows importance scores relevant to the coherence 
shifting hypothesis. The predicted choice by time by job favored interaction was 
significant, (Pillai’s = 0.222, F(2, 115) = 16.36, p < .001, ηG2 =0.064), showing a small 
effect on importance ratings. As shown in Figure 4, importance ratings shifted as 
predicted by the strong form of the coherence shifting hypothesis. Other significant main 
effects and interactions were found. See Appendix D (Table D3) for full statistical 
results. 
Job task: Affect. Coherence shifting of affect ratings towards job outcomes was 
examined using a 2 by 2 by 2 (final choice by job outcome by time) mixed-model 
MANOVA with the outcome affect ratings paired across the 4 attributes as dependent 
variables. Seven participants were identified as multivariate outliers on affect scores, 
resulting in a sample of 118. Of these, 75 chose Splendor (65.2%) and 43 chose Bonnie’s 
Best (34.8%). Figure 5 shows a summary of changes in affect scores by choice, outcome 
job, and time. The predicted 3-way interaction was not significant, (Pillai’s = 0.073., F(4, 
113) = 2.22, p = 0.072, ηG2 =0.017), with a negligible effect size. Thus, coherence shifting
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in job outcome affect scores was not supported. Other significant main effects and 
interactions were found (see Appendix D, Tables D4.1 and D4.2). (In univariate 
ANOVAs with the same independent variables, the 3-way interaction testing coherence 
shifting was only significant for Office type (F(1. 116) = 5.53, p = 0.020, ηG2 = 0.006), 
but this effect was negligible in size.) 
Figure 4. Study 1 average job task attribute importance ratings favoring Splendor or BB by choice and 
time.Choosers of each treatment changed scores from the pre- to mid-time in opposite directions in 
accordance with the strong form of coherence shifting under Hypothesis 2. BB = Bonnie’s Best. Error bars 
= 2 SE. 
Figure 5. Study 1 average job task affect outcome ratings by choice and time. The choice by treatment by time 
interaction for changes from pre- to mid-choice ratings was significant. BB = Bonnie’s Best. Error bars = 2 
SE. 
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 To summarize the results for the job task, coherence shifting of importance 
scores was significant and showed a small effect size. Coherence shifting was not 
supported for affect ratings. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that higher coherence shifting would lead to a decrease in 
aversive feelings towards the decision and in arousal after the mid-choice time. 
Hypothesis 3 was not examined in Experiment 1. 
Between-Task Comparisons and Exploratory Analysis. 
Participants who were identified as multivariate outliers on any previous analysis 
were removed from the following analyses, resulting in a sample size of N = 106.  
Between-Task Aversive Feelings: Hypothesis 4 suggested that aversive feelings 
towards a decision would be higher in a serious disease treatment task than the job 
selection task, which threatened lower-level goals. To assess differences in aversive 
feelings related to the decision task as a whole, participant scores on the 4 items on the 
aversive feelings scale were compared using 4 paired-samples t-tests. Descriptive 
statistics and statistical tests are presented in Appendix D (Table D5). Participants 
reported significantly higher aversive feelings during the serious disease task than during 
the job task for all scales. Aversive feelings were rated 1.32 points higher on an 8-point 
scale, on average. Reliability for the aversive feelings scale was high in both the serious 
disease (α = 0.872) and job (α = 0.875) tasks.  
Between-Task Coherence Shifting. One important contribution of this research 
program is a comparison of coherence shifting between tasks that involve different 
decision contexts and outcomes on substantially different attributes. Past research has 
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identified differences in decision strategy based on attributes threatening higher- vs. 
lower-level goals, but not differences in the degree of coherence shifting (Luce, 1998; 
Payne & Bettman, 2004). In Experiment 1, job task attributes threatened relatively lower-
level goals such as comfort (e.g., office size, commute), whereas the serious disease task 
threatened higher level goals such as health and survival. (Serious disease outcomes were 
also manipulated to be highly unpleasant, creating a likely confound with differences in 
emotional salience. Differences in emotional salience will be examined independently in 
Experiment 2.) Given the lack of empirical evidence to form a hypothesis, I have 
presented between-task comparisons in an exploratory manner.  
To compare the levels of coherence shifting individuals engaged in between tasks, 
attribute importance and outcome affect ratings were combined into aggregate variables 
using a technique used by Simon et al. (2004) and Carpenter et al. (2016). Importance 
and affect ratings at each time were scaled and then combined into measures where +1 
would indicate complete favorability towards one alternative (Treatment K or Splendor 
job) and -1 would indicate complete favorability towards the other (M or Bonnie’s Best). 
This is mathematically defined in Appendix G. Aggregated scores at the pre-choice time 
are subtracted from the mid-choice time, indicating the degree of change in favorability 
towards attributes or outcomes is consistent with coherence shifting. Absolute values (A) 
of these scores represent overall strength of coherence shifting (CS) for affect (ACSAff) 
and importance (ACSImp). 
Paired-samples t-tests were used to compare absolute pre- to mid-choice 
coherence shifting between the job and serious disease tasks (See Appendix D, Table 
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D5). Overall shifting of importance scores was not significantly different between the 
disease task (M = 0.052, SD = 0.048) and the job task (M= 0.066, SD = 0.069), t (105) = -
1.91, p = 0.058. In contrast, overall shifting in affect scores was significantly higher in 
the disease task (M = 0.110, SD =0.092) than in the job task (M=0.076, SD=0.056). t 
(105) = 3.20, p = 0.002.
Emotional Regulation and Confidence. Following Carpenter et al. (2016),
correlations were calculated in both tasks between absolute scores of coherence shifting 
and self-report measures of emotional regulation strategies. Descriptive statistics and 
statistical tests are reported in Appendix D (Table D5). Correlations are reported in 
Appendix D (Table D6). Pre- to mid-choice shifting of affect scores (ACSAff) in the 
serious disease task were weakly but significantly correlated with Cognitive Reappraisal, 
r (106) = 0.227. p = 0.019, r2 = 0.051, i.e., stronger coherence shifting was associated 
with a higher tendency to change one’s thinking in response to an emotional stimulus. No 
other significant correlations between coherence shifting and emotion regulation 
strategies were found. This pattern differs from findings by Carpenter et al. (2016) using 
the same job task as in the current study. They found that coherence shifting of combined 
desirability (similar to affect) and importance scores correlated positively with the 
expression suppression scale of emotional regulation, but not with cognitive reappraisal. 
Another exploratory analysis focused on the idea that coherence shifting may 
serve to increase participants’ confidence that they have made the correct decision, which 
should reduce their negative emotions related to the decision. Ratings of confidence in 
the final decisions in the serious disease and job tasks were examined for correlations 
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with overall coherence shifting. See Appendix D (Table D6) for full correlations. 
Stronger shifting of affect scores in the serious disease task was correlated with greater 
decision confidence, r (106) = 0.304, p = 0.002, r2 = 0.092. Stronger shifting of job 
importance scores correlated with greater confidence in the final job chosen, r (106) = 
0.208, p = 0.033, r2 = 0.043. Coherence shifting was not significantly correlated with any 
changes in confidence across the course of the decision, as calculated by subtracting 
confidence in the mid-choice leaning from final choice confidence ratings.  
Prior Experience and Outside Influences. In order to determine if any factors 
outside of the decision context affected treatment choice (such as those reported in Wong 
et al, 2013), participants completed single-item measures of health insurance coverage 
(yes or no), experience with malaria in themselves or someone close to them (yes or no), 
and the extent to which they avoid medical procedures due to a fear of injections or 
needles. Only 3 participants (2.8%) indicated previous experience with malaria and only 
4 participants (3.8%) reported that they did not have health insurance. Given the small 
number of participants in these categories, Fisher’s exact tests were used for these 
comparisons. An independent-samples t-test was used to examine fear of needles and 
treatment choice. Those with malaria experience chose treatment K about as often (1 out 
of 3, 66.7%) as those without experience (67 of 103, 65.0%), Fisher’s Exact p = 0.722. 
Those with health insurance chose treatment K about as often (66 of 102, 64.7%) as those 
without insurance (3 out of 4, 75% chose K), Fisher’s Exact p = 0.564. Fear of needles 
was not significantly different between those who chose K (n = 69, M = 7.49, SD = 2.45) 
and those who chose M (n=37, M = 6.78, SD = 1.72)  ̧t (96.74) = 1.87, p = 0.086. 
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Experiment 1 Summary 
The hypothesis regarding the predictive analyses (#1) was partially supported in 
both tasks. A model including pre-choice outcome affect and mid-choice feelings (2.1) 
was either similarly predictive (serious disease task) or less predictive (job task) of choice 
than a model only including mid-choice feelings towards alternatives (Model 2.0). Thus, 
including pre-choice affect ratings did not substantially improve prediction of choice. 
These results support the theory that choice is constructed from the affective evaluation 
of alternatives as a whole, since adding in pre-existing preferences towards individual 
outcomes either did not improve prediction much or made it worse. However, they do not 
support the hypothesis that pre-choice affect towards outcomes would improve the ability 
to predict choice. The expectation that the above affect-based models would predict 
choice better than attribute-based models like weighted additive and lexicographic was 
supported. 
The coherence-shifting hypothesis (#2), which predicted that affect and 
importance ratings would shift prior to a final decision to be more favorable toward the 
alternative chosen, was supported for some importance ratings in both tasks, and (in a 
more general form) for affect ratings only in the disease task. These findings support the 
theory of coherence shifting in a health context, where emotional reactions are adjusted 
before choice as part of the decision-making process. However, the size of the coherence 
shifting effects was low; ranging from negligible (ηG2 = 0.016) to small (ηG2 = 0.064). 
Although shifting of affect scores in the job task did not replicate similar findings by 
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Simon et al. (2004) in outcome desirability ratings, shifting in importance scores was 
replicated. 
Participants reported stronger task-related aversive feelings during the serious 
disease task, supporting Hypothesis 4. Participants showed stronger aversive feelings in a 
task with highly unpleasant outcomes that threaten higher-level goals than in a task with 
relatively emotionally neutral outcomes threatening lower-level goals. Participants also 
shifted affect scores more strongly between the pre- and mid-choice times in the serious 
disease task, but did not show differences in importance score shifting. A significant 
positive correlation was found between an emotion regulation strategy (cognitive 
reappraisal) and coherence shifting, but only in the serious disease task and only for 
affect scores. Taken together, these findings suggest that participants changed their affect 
towards outcomes to reduce overall aversive feelings towards a decision, but only when 
the task produced sufficiently negative emotions. Participants showed coherence shifting 
for importance scores in both tasks, but these shifts were not correlated with broad 
emotion regulation strategies. Experiment 2 examined the use of coherence shifting as 
emotion regulation more directly, using an objective physiological affect measure.  
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EXPERIMENT 2: PHYSIOLOGICAL AROUSAL AND MULTIPLE DISEASE 
TREATMENT DECISIONS 
Experiment 2 expanded upon Experiment 1 in two ways. First, rather than using 
an emotionally neutral job selection task, participants in this experiment completed 
treatment decision tasks for a relatively mild disease with moderately negative physical 
outcomes and a serious disease with severe physical outcomes. Unlike the two dissimilar 
tasks in Experiment 1, these two tasks used the same attributes and used outcomes 
selected from the pilot to provide similar levels of conflict between alternatives. This was 
intended to reduce between-task differences in attribute-based threats to important goals 
(Luce, 1998). In addition, selecting outcomes that were an equal distance apart on pilot 
affect ratings (ratings of 2 & 4 vs. ratings of 4 & 6) provided a level of control over 
decision conflict as defined by Carpenter and Niedenthal (2017). 
Second, in addition to self-report measures, this study used an objective measure 
of physiological arousal as an index of aversive emotions. If coherence shifting serves an 
emotional regulation role, physiological arousal should decrease for people who have 
shifted their preferences, as found by Carpenter et al. (2016).  
Skin Conductance for Physiological Arousal 
In addition to all measures used in Experiment 1, skin conductance was used as an 
objective measure of physiological arousal. Skin conductance is a measure of the 
electrical conductivity of the skin based on eccrine sweating, which is directly related to 
the autonomic nervous system. Skin conductance has seen extensive use as a measure of 
affective response in decision-making research (Figner & Murphy, 2011) and of general 
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stress or arousal in experimental settings (Boucsein, 2012). With roughly a 1 to 5 s delay 
before response to a specific stimulus, skin conductance is a slow or time-lagged measure 
compared to physiological measures such as event-related potentials. It is also sensitive 
to artifacts related to movement, respiration, and speaking. Even if it were a perfectly 
reliable measure of autonomic nervous system activity or physiological arousal, 
physiological arousal is simply an activation of the sympathetic nervous system, and 
relies further on cognitive evaluation of the context of the situation to be interpreted as a 
positive or negative emotional state (Loewenstein et al. 2001). Arousal is affected by 
many other physiological and mental processes, making it difficult to claim that any 
particular skin conductance response is definitely related to affect. Within affect, skin 
conductance only reliably aligns with the arousal dimension. Additional subjective 
measures, such as those included in this experiment, are usually required to assess 
positivity, dominance, or other dimensions (Figner & Murphy). In spite of these 
limitations, skin conductance response is sufficiently sensitive to detect immediate 
affective responses to anticipated rewards and punishments in decision making, and even 
to detect anticipatory affect that predicts decision-making in repeated-decision tasks such 
as the Iowa Gambling Task in line with the somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara, Tranel, 
& Damasio, 2000; Bechara et al., 1996).  
One important issue in selecting a measure of skin conductance is the difference 
between phasic and tonic skin conductance measures, and their use for short-term or 
persistent affective responses. Tonic changes in skin conductance level (SCL) are gradual 
increases or decreases in skin conductance. Phasic changes or skin conductance 
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responses (SCR) are rapid, short-term elevations in conductance followed by a delayed 
decline. To examine the role of coherence shifting in regulating negative affect, 
Carpenter et al. (2016) measured SCRs occurring between 1 and 3 s after each screen 
where participants completed importance and desirability ratings. They defined these 
SCRs as negative emotion caused by decision conflict and proposed that lower SCRs in 
the post-decision period represented a regulation of emotion. However, they selected this 
measure and time period due to its use in past decision making research, where it was 
used to index short-term affective responses to the outcomes of decision-making 
(Bechara et al, 2000; Bechara et al., 1996). These are known as specific responses, or 
SCRs that are related to a specific stimulus. Carpenter et al. (2016) intended to measure 
medium-term (e.g., minutes) changes in aversive feelings towards a decision as a whole, 
but used a measurement window traditionally used to identify rapid (e.g., seconds) 
affective reactions to a specific stimulus (e.g., reading one decision outcome). It  is not 
possible to distinguish between these sources of affect using SCR, a potential confound.  
Carpenter et al. (2106) proposed that aversive feelings arise from the difficulty of 
a decision itself, with coherence shifting serving to reduce these feelings. If these feelings 
are persistent until a regulatory process occurs, their role should be more similar to an 
ongoing stressor than to a rapid affective reaction. Measures of SCL, or tonic skin 
conductance level, are more commonly used and reliable for measuring the impact of 
laboratory stressors (Boucsein, 2012). These includes threats of physical pain or watching 
disturbing video clips, but some are even accurate for detecting weaker, instruction-based 
threats (Boucsein; Kilpatrick, 1972). These measures use various methods of eliminating 
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specific responses, such as measuring only in windows devoid of responses or 
statistically removing spikes characteristic of a response. It is still not possible to 
distinguish between sources of negative affect or the nature of the decision-making 
process through this measure, but an SCL measure should be able to distinguish between 
changes in persistent aversive feelings on the one hand and simple, short-term affective 
responses to decision information on the other. Equipment used to record skin 
conductance necessarily records both SCR and SCL, so both were analyzed. 
Method 
Participants. An additional power analysis was conducted for the effect of time 
and psychological threat on skin conductance using a similar interaction taken from 
Kilpatrick (1972), r = .331. Using a multilevel model power analysis method provided by 
Bickel (2007) with an alpha = .05, power = 0.80, the projected sample size needed to 
reproduce this interaction effect size was N = 46. Thus, power analyses from Experiment 
1 still provide the conservative estimate. 
Participants included 95 Clemson University psychology students (Age: 
M=19.87, SD=2.61, 70.2% female). Participants were treated according to APA ethical 
guidelines under the supervision of Clemson University’s Institutional Review Board. 
Recruitment in Study 2 was lower than in Study 1 because measuring skin conductance 
required testing participants individually and there were two sessions (two weeks apart) 
compared to Study 1’s single session. This resulted in a lower power of analyses in Study 
2. Participants were compensated at a rate of $10 for an initial session and $20 for a
second session. This incentive was used to reduce participant dropout between sessions. 
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Design. The overall experiment followed a 2 (decision task: mild vs. serious 
disease treatment) by 3 (measurement time: pre-, mid-, post-choice) within-subjects 
design. Analysis focused only on the pre- and mid-choice times. Final choice between 
alternatives for each decision task (Mild disease treatment: Treatment T or N; Serious 
disease treatment: Treatment K or M) was dichotomous and was used as a between-
subjects predictor variable or a criterion depending upon the analysis. An aggregate 
measure of preference shifting based on outcome affect and attribute importance ratings 
was used to predict changes in physiological arousal. Analyses for each decision task 
were conducted separately. 
All dependent variables measured in Experiment 1 were included in Experiment 
2. In addition, SCR and SCL were measured at a baseline and at pre-choice, mid-choice,
and post-choice rating times. 
Measures. All dependent variables and demographics measures used in 
Experiment 1 were also collected in Experiment 2. Skin conductance was recorded using 
a Biopac GSR100 skin conductance module, MP150 base module, and STP100C digital 
interface. AcqKnowledge software was used to record skin conductance data. Based on 
recommendations by Figner and Murphy (2011), disposable electrodes were placed on 
the distal (first) phalanges of the index and middle finger of the participant’s non-
dominant hand. Skin conductance sampling acquisition was set to 500 Hz (samples/sec). 
Hardware was set to record using DC, with amplification set to 5 μSiemens/V and a low-
pass filter set to 1 Hz. Experimenters measured ambient temperature within the 
laboratory at the beginning and end of every session. Coded markers were automatically 
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placed in AcqKnowledge software through MediaLab software and were verified in real 
time by experimenters. Experimenters also recorded the time and nature of any 
disturbances that may have led to recording artifacts. 
Procedure. Participants attended 2 sessions, a minimum of 2 weeks apart. 
Experimental sessions were conducted with one participant and one experimenter. Each 
session included either the serious disease treatment decision (identical to Experiment 1, 
see Table 3) or the mild disease treatment decision shown in Table 2. Participants were 
randomly assigned to complete the mild or serious disease task first. The materials and 
measures for the mild disease treatment decision were the same as those for the serious 
disease decision, except that the instructions asked participants to imagine that they had 
been diagnosed with a strain of influenza and that the outcomes listed were those in Table 
2 rather than those in Table 3. Attributes were the same between tasks. 
Stimuli were presented in MediaLab (v2012) software. The general timing of 
materials and measures were the same as in Experiment 1, except that the experimenter 
controlled when the participants proceeded between rating times. Skin conductance was 
only recorded during the baseline measure and at the pre-, mid-, and post-choice rating 
times. For each session, after providing consent, participants first had electrodes placed 
on their non-dominant hand. After at least five minutes, a baseline measure of skin 
conductance was recorded. This included an active baseline (participants taking a deep 
breath) followed by a two-minute passive baseline (during which they were instructed not 
to move or talk.). The process was repeated with fresh electrodes for null responses. 
Participants were asked to avoid body movement, any motion in their non-dominant 
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hand, or speech during tasks as to avoid recording artifacts. Each measurement period 
took no longer than 5 minutes and participants were informed when measurement was 
occurring and when they were free to move or talk.    
After these instructions, the experimenter began recording skin conductance and 
the participants were shown the pre-choice instructions and ratings as in Experiment 1. 
Markers were automatically placed at each screen including experimental stimuli and at 
each rating. Skin conductance was recorded during both outcome and attribute ratings 
(and, for later tasks, choice). After this, participants completed either a spatial reasoning 
task (Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976) or items from a personal interests survey 
(Goldberg, 2010) as a distractor task. Distractors used different items between tasks and 
were presented in a cross-balanced order with instructions that they were not intelligence 
tests to avoid external stress. 
After the first distractor, the participant was shown mid-choice materials 
including the instruction that the treatment decision must be delayed for laboratory 
bloodwork.  This delay instruction was present in both disease tasks. The experimenter 
resumed recording and the participants completed mid-choice ratings. Participants then 
completed the second distractor. The experimenter then resumed recording and the 
participant made a final decision and provided post-choice ratings as in Experiment 1. 
Participants then completed demographic and external influence measures, which 
were recorded in the first session. The experimenter then removed the disposable 
electrodes. The participant was then compensated with $10 in cash and asked to schedule 
a second session at least two weeks later. This was partially to allow time for preferences 
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to return to a pre-decision baseline. Simon et al. (2008) found that preferences revert very 
quickly over time, but only using relatively emotionally neutral tasks. More importantly, 
this time lapse was meant to reduce order effects and prevent affect from the prior 
decision from influencing arousal in the later decision. 
In the second session, each participant returned and completed the second task. 
This followed the same pattern and timeline as the first session, only with the other 
disease treatment decision task and with alternate distractor task content. Participants 
were compensated with $20, fully debriefed, and dismissed after the second session. 
Results 
Predicting Choice: Mild Disease Task.  A separate predictive analysis was 
conducted for each task. One participant was identified as a multivariate outlier on all 
predictor and outcome variables and eliminated from predictive analysis for the mild 
disease task. An additional 4 participants were excluded due to computer errors resulting 
in incomplete data. This resulted in a sample size for the mild disease task of N = 90. 
Treatment T was chosen by 24 participants (26.7%), and Treatment N was chosen by 66 
participants (73.3%). Model multiple regression omnibus statistical tests, effect size, and 
fit information for the mild disease task are available in Table 7. All models significantly 
predicted choice, p < .05.  
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Table 7: Model statistical tests and fit for the Study 2 Mild Disease task 
Model 
Log 




R2 adjusted AIC 
0 Null -52.19 - - 0.000 0.000 106.39 
1.0 Affect (Charpentier) -43.02 18.36* (8) 0.019 0.176 0.022 104.03 
2.0 Affect (Mid-choice) -27.19 50.00** (6) < .001 0.479 0.364 68.39 
2.1 Affect (Schlösser) -19.23 65.94** (14) < .001 0.632 0.363 68.45 
3.0 Attribute-based -46.01 12.38* (4) 0.015 0.118 0.042 102.01 
3.1 Lexicographic -48.54 7.30* (2) 0.026 0.070 0.032 103.09 
4.0 W.Add (Main effects) -38.7 29.98* (12) 0.008 0.258 0.029 103.4 
4.1 W.Add (Interaction) -35.6 33.19* (20) 0.032 0.318 -0.065 113.2 
N = 90. * p < .05, ** p < .001. AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. W.Add = Weighted Additive. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that Model 2.1, which contained affect towards outcomes 
outside of the decision context (pre-choice) and feelings towards alternatives during 
decision making (mid-choice), would best predict choice. Model 2.0, which included 
only mid-choice feelings for alternatives, showed the best fit (AIC = 68.39). Model 2.1 
(AIC = 68.45) also strongly predicted choice (as it was within 2 AIC of Model 2.1). No 
other models provide substantial fit.  
Regression coefficients and odds ratios for predictors in the mild disease task are 
presented in Appendix E (Tables E1.1 through E1.3). In both models 2.0 and 2.1, 
Positivity towards both alternatives significantly predicted choice. In Model 2.0, 
Dominance towards N also significantly predicted choice. Positivity most strongly 
predicted choice. In Model 2.0, participants became 2.35 times more likely to choose 
67
Treatment T for every 1 point increase in positivity towards T. Participants became 2.85 
(1/0.35) times more likely to choose Treatment N for every 1 point increase in positivity 
towards N.  
The similar fits of Model 2.1 and 2.0 and the fact that none of the specific pre-
choice affect scores in Model 2.1 significantly predicted treatment choice suggests that 
affect towards alternatives during decision making is the strongest predictor of choice and 
affect towards outcomes outside of the decision context was not predictive. This only 
partially supported Hypothesis 1. 
Predicting Choice: Serious Disease Task (Experiment 2).   Five participants 
were eliminated from predictive analysis for the serious disease task (Experiment 2) as 
multivariate outliers and an additional 2 participants were excluded due to experimental 
errors, resulting in a sample size of N = 88. Treatment K was chosen by 41 participants 
(46.5%) and Treatment M was chosen by 47 participants (53.4%). Model omnibus 
statistical tests, effect sizes, and fit information for the serious disease task are available 
in Table 8.  
Findings were similar to the mild disease task. Only Models 2.0 and 2.1 
significantly predicted choice. Model 2.0 (only mid-choice feelings towards alternatives) 
was the best-fitting model (AIC = 64.9). No other models provided substantial fit, 
including the hypothesized best-fitting model, 2.1. This only partially supported 
Hypothesis 1. In Model 2.0, positivity towards both alternatives significantly predicted 
job choice and most strongly predicted choice. In Model 2.0, participants became 1.97 
times more likely to choose Treatment K for every 1 point increase in positivity towards 
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K. Participants became 2.63 (1/0.38) times more likely to choose Treatment M for every
1 point increase in positivity towards M (see Appendix E, Tables E2.1 and E2.2).  
The findings from these predictive analyses were similar to those from Study 1, 
which also found that Model 2.0 was always the most predictive of choice or equally as 
predictive as Model 2.1 and that ratings of positivity towards alternatives were the 
strongest individual predictors of choice. Across both studies, Hypothesis 1 was partially 
supported—as affect towards alternatives during decision making predicted choice—and 
partially disconfirmed—as affect towards outcomes outside of the decision context did 
not predict choice. 
Table 8: Model statistical tests and fit for the Study 2 Serious Disease task 
Model 
Log 




R2 adjusted AIC 
0 Null -60.79 - - 0.000 0.000 123.58 
1.0 Affect (Charpentier) -57.72 6.15 (8) 0.631 0.051 -0.081 133.44 
2.0 Affect (Mid-choice) -25.46 70.66** (6) < .001 0.581 0.482 64.92 
2.1 Affect (Schlösser) -20.15 81.29** (14) < .001 0.669 0.471 70.30 
3.0 Attribute-based -57.77 6.04 (4) 0.196 0.050 -0.016 125.55 
3.1 Lexicographic -58.79 4.00 (2) 0.135 0.033 0.000 123.59 
4.0 W.Add (Main effects) -54.72 12.15 (12) 0.434 0.100 -0.098 140.36 
4.1 W.Add (Interaction) -48.57 24.44 (20) 0.224 0.201 0.037 139.15 
N = 88. * p < .05, ** p < .001. AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. W.Add = Weighted Additive. 
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Coherence Shifting: Mild Disease Task. 
Mild Disease: Importance. The coherence shifting hypothesis (#2) stated that when 
treatment T was chosen, importance ratings for attributes favoring T would increase from 
pre- to mid-choice and attributes favoring N would decrease; with the opposite pattern 
expected when N was chosen. Four participants were excluded due to experimental 
errors, resulting in a sample of 91. Of these, 25 chose Treatment T (26.4%) and 67 chose 
Treatment N (73.6%). Figure 6 shows importance scores averaged across favored 
treatment by choice and time. Participants who chose N seemed to show the strong form 
of coherence shifting, with importance ratings increasing or decreasing over time 
depending on whether attributes favored their choice or not, respectively. In contrast, T 
choosers seemed to show little coherence shifting (parallel lines for change over time). In 
a 2 (choice) by 2 (treatment favored) by 2 (time) MANOVA, the predicted choice by 
treatment-favored by time interaction for importance ratings was significant, (Pillai’s = 
.075, F(2, 88) = 3.55, p  = 0.033, ηG2 =0.018), but showed a negligible effect size. Other 
significant main effects and interactions were found, see Appendix F (See Tables F1.1 
and F1.2). 
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Figure 6. Study 2 average mild disease attribute importance ratings favoring T or N by choice and time. N 
choosers shifted importance scores between the pre- and mid-choice times in accordance with strong-form 
coherence shifting, whereas T choosers generally decreased all importance ratings but showed high 
individual variability. N = 91. Error bars = 2SE. 
Separate within-subjects 2 by 2 (time by treatment favored) repeated-measures 
ANOVAs were conducted for T and N choosers. A significant treatment-favored by time 
interaction supported the strong form of coherence shifting for N choosers (F (1, 66) = 
20.37, p < .001, ηG2 =0.105), a small effect. This interaction was not significant for T 
choosers (F (1, 23) < 1, p = .946 ηG2 =0.000), which provides no support for coherence 
shifting. See Appendix F (Table F1.2) for full ANOVA results. Thus, for the mild disease 
task, coherence shifting of importance ratings was supported for N choosers but not for T 
choosers.  
Mild disease task: Affect. Four participants were excluded due to experimental 
errors and 1 was identified as a multivariate outlier on affect scores, resulting in a sample 
of 90. Of these, 24 chose Treatment T (26.7%) and 67 chose Treatment N (73.3%). 
Figure 7 shows outcome ratings changing in the direction predicted by the strong version 
of coherence shifting for both T and N choosers. In a 2 (choice) by 2 (outcome treatment) 
by 2 (time) MANOVA, the predicted choice by time interaction in overall outcome affect 
ratings was significant, (Pillai’s = 0.226, F(2, 88) = 6.29, p = <.001, ηG2 =0.060), 
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representing a small effect. Appendix F (Tables F2.1 & F2.2) includes complete 
statistical analysis. Other significant main effects and interactions were found.  
Figure 7. Study 2 average mild disease affect outcome ratings by choice and time. The choice by time 
interaction for changes from pre- to mid-choice ratings is visible. N = 90. Error bars = 2SE. 
To summarize, for the mild disease task, coherence shifting of importance scores 
was supported for participants who made one choice, but not for those who made the 
other choice. Coherence shifting of affect scores was supported, with an effect size of ηG2 
=0.08. 
Coherence Shifting: Serious Disease Task (Experiment 2) 
 Serious Disease: Importance. Three participants were excluded as multivariate 
outliers and another 2 were excluded due to experimental error, resulting in a sample of 
90. Of these, 41 chose Treatment K (45.6%) and 49 chose Treatment M (54.4%). Figure
8 shows changes in importance scores consistent with the general form of coherence 
shifting for K choosers and the strong form for M choosers. From the choice by treatment 
favored by time MANOVA, the 3-way interaction for importance predicted by the 
coherence shifting hypothesis scores was significant, (Pillai’s = 0.098, F(2, 87) = 4.72, p  
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= .011, ηG2 =0.025), and showed a small effect size. Other significant main effects and 
interactions were found, see Appendix F (Tables F2.1 and F2.2).  
Figure 8. Study 2 average serious disease attribute importance ratings favoring K or M by choice and time. 
The predicted choice by time interaction was significant. N = 90. Error bars = 2SE. 
. 
Serious disease task: Affect. Two participants were excluded as multivariate outliers 
on affect scores and 2 were excluded due to experimental errors, resulting in a sample of 
91. Of these, 43 chose Treatment K (47.3%) and 48 chose Treatment M (52.7%). The
direction of changes shown in Figure 9 do not match the predictions of strong coherence 
shifting but do match the pattern of general coherence shifting seen in the serious disease 
task in Experiment 1.  In the 2 by 2 by 2 choice by time by outcome-treatment 
MANOVA, the predicted choice by time interaction in overall outcome affect ratings was 
significant, (Pillai’s = 0.368., F(4, 86) = 12.52, p < .001, ηG2 = 0.117), and had a small 
effect size. However, this effect size was more than five times as large as the same 
interaction for this task in Experiment 1. The general form of coherence shifting (but not 
the strong form predicted in Hypothesis 2) was supported for coherence shifting in 
serious disease treatment outcome affect scores. Other significant main effects and 
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interactions were found, Appendix F (Tables F4.1 and F4.2) for full statistical results. 
Figure 9.: Study 2 average serious disease outcome affect ratings by choice and time. Similar to the same task in 
Experiment 1, participants generally increased affect ratings between the pre- and mid-choice times, but 
showed steeper increases for their chosen treatment. N = 90. Error bars = 2SE. 
Experiment 2 Coherence Shifting Summary 
Findings in coherence shifting were similar between Experiments 1 and 2. Overall 
coherence shifting was supported for importance scores in all four tasks. Affect 
coherence shifting was not supported for the Experiment 1 job task, but was supported in 
all treatment decision tasks across the two experiments. More support was found for the 
general form of coherence shifting than for the strong form predicted in Hypothesis 2. 
The general form appeared in affect ratings for the serious disease task in both 
experiments and in Experiment 2 serious disease importance ratings. Effect sizes for the 
coherence shifting interaction were much larger in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1, 
especially for the serious disease task used in both experiments. This is likely an effect of 
the inclusion of a distractor task between the pre- and mid-choice ratings, which was 
omitted in the first Experiment.  
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Experiment 2 Coherence Shifting, Aversive Feelings and Physiological 
Arousal. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that higher coherence shifting would lead to a decrease in 
aversive feelings and physiological arousal after the mid-choice time, as shifting has been 
proposed as a mechanism for reducing decision-related negative affect (Carpenter et al. 
2016; Carpenter & Niedenthal, 2017).  
Physiological data were analyzed for a small pilot sample from Experiment 2 
participants (n = 39). (Full analyses will be presented in an upcoming publication.) SCR 
and SCL values were calculated for the full period during which participants rated 
outcome affect, with responses to known artifacts (e.g., participant movement) 
subtracted. Tonic skin conductance (SCR) was calculated as the average amplitude of 
responses across this period in µS. Phasic skin conductance (SCL) was calculated as the 
minimum amplitude of skin conductance during this period. SCR or SCL scores from the 
resting baseline were subtracted from the respective measure. Participants who failed to 
display any skin conductance responses during at least one full recording period were 
eliminated from analysis for possible recording errors, resulting in sample sizes of n = 16 
(Mild disease task) and n =14 (Serious disease task). 
For each task, two multiple linear regression models were conducted with a 
composite measure of coherence shifting (zACSoverall, see Appendix G), linear and 
quadratic terms for recording time (pre-, mid-, and post-choice), and interactions between 
coherence shifting, linear time, and quadratic time as predictors and skin conductance 
(SCL or SCR) at the three recording times as the criterion. Phasic skin conductance 
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(SCL) is the preferred measure for long-term changes in arousal, such as overall arousal 
due to the decision as a whole (Boucsein, 2012). Hypothesis 3 would be supported if a 
coherence shifting x time (quadratic) interaction was significant and showed a sharper 
decrease in SCL between the mid- and post-choice rating times for people who showed 
stronger coherence shifting. 
Neither time nor coherence shifting significantly predicted SCR in either task (p’s 
> .05), so no further data is presented. Figure 10 shows simple quadratic slopes of SCL
for high, average, and low coherence shifting over time. Regression coefficients 
predicting SCL are shown in Appendix F (Table F5). Coherence shifting and the critical 
coherence shifting x time (quadratic) interaction were not significant predictors of SCL. 
Thus, coherence shifting did not lead to slope differences in SCL over time. Hypothesis 3 
was not supported in this pilot sample. Strength of coherence shifting did not predict 
changes in arousal, but participants did show similar patterns of change in arousal across 
decision times. SCL was significantly predicted by both linear and quadratic terms for 
time in both the mild and serious disease tasks. In both tasks, SCL generally increased 
between pre- and mid-choice times and then decreased between mid- and post-choice 
times. 
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Figure 10. Study 2 simple quadratic slopes of SCL over time by level of coherence shifting. SCL changed 
significantly over time, but coherence shifting did not significantly predict slope differences. Hi = 
maximum non-outlier participant coherence shifting score (< 2SE). Med = average coherence shifting. Lo = 
minimum non-outlier participant coherence shifting. Mild disease N = 16, Serious disease N = 14). 
Experiment 2 Between-Task Comparisons and Exploratory Analysis. 
 Participants who had been identified as multivariate outliers on any previous 
analysis were removed from the following analyses, resulting in a sample size of N = 84. 
Group descriptive statistics and statistical tests are presented in Appendix F (Table F6), 
while correlational results and overall descriptive statistics are available in Table F7. 
Between-Task Aversive Feelings: Hypothesis 4 predicted that aversive feelings 
would be higher in tasks that have less pleasant physical outcomes. Both the mild and 
serious disease tasks threaten goals important to health and survival (e.g., efficacy of a 
treatment, intrusive side effects and administration methods), but serious disease 
outcomes were selected to produce higher negative affect than mild disease outcomes. 
Accordingly, aversive feelings towards a decision should be higher in a serious disease 
treatment than in the mild disease task. To assess differences in aversive feelings caused 
by decision tasks, participants’ scores on the 4 items on the aversive feelings scale 
(feeling anxious, stressed, unpleasant, and conflicted) were compared using 4 paired-
77
samples t-tests. Participants reported significantly higher aversive feelings during the 
serious disease task than during the mild task for all scales, rating aversive feelings 1.17 
points higher on an 8-point scale on average. Reliability for the aversive feelings scale 
was high in both the mild disease (α = 0.863) and serious disease (α = 0.916) tasks. 
Between-Task Coherence Shifting. To compare the degree of coherence shifting 
individuals engaged in between tasks, attribute importance and outcome affect were 
combined into aggregate variables using the technique described in Experiment 1. 
Absolute values of these scores represent overall strength of coherence shifting for affect 
(ACSAff) and importance (ACSImp). Paired-samples t-tests were used to compare absolute 
pre- to mid-choice coherence shifting between the mild and serious disease tasks. See 
Appendix F for full statistics (Table F6). Overall shifting of importance scores was not 
significantly different between the mild disease task (M = 0.084, SD = 0.075) and the 
serious disease task (M = 0.083, SD = 0.069), t (83) = -0.08, p = 0.934. Overall shifting in 
affect scores was also not significantly different between the mild disease task (M = 
0.101, SD = 0.076) than in the serious disease task (M = 0.113, SD = 0.082). t (83) = 
0.94, p =0.359.  
Emotional Regulation and Confidence. To further investigate Carpenter et al.’s 
(2016) findings concerning coherence shifting and emotional regulation, correlations 
were calculated between absolute coherence-shifting scores for both tasks and self-report 
measures of emotional regulation strategies from the BEQ and ERQ. Descriptive 
statistics and correlations are reported in Appendix F (Table F7). Pre- to mid-choice 
shifting of affect scores in the mild disease task had small positive correlations with 
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Negative Emotionality (BEQ; r(82) = 0.293, p = 0.007, r2=0.085), Impulse Strength 
(BEQ; r(82) = 0.273, p = 0.012, r2=0.074), Overall Emotional Expressivity (BEQ; r(82) 
= 0.288, p = 0.008, r2=0.083), but was not significantly correlated with BEQ Positive 
Emotionality, ERQ expressive suppression, or ERQ cognitive reappraisal (p’s > 0.05). 
Together, these findings indicate that people who are more likely to express their 
negative feelings strongly in their daily lives engaged in more coherence shifting 
regarding affect in the mild disease task. These results are in direct contradiction with 
results reported by Carpenter et al., who found that coherence shifting was significantly 
negatively correlated with the exact same subscales of the BEQ in a relatively 
emotionally neutral job selection task, in the opposite direction of correlation. No 
significant correlations were found between strategy measures and mild disease 
importance shifting or either type of serious disease score shifting.   
Coherence shifting was also not found to correlate with final decision confidence 
or changes in confidence within each task. 
Prior Experience and Outside Influences. In order to determine if any outside 
factors affected treatment choice, choice in both treatments was compared based on 
health insurance status, needle fear, and malaria experience (serious disease only). Two 
additional measures of experience with influenza were added for the mild disease task. 
One question asked if they or anyone close to them had ever been diagnosed with 
influenza or “flu” (yes or no), and the second question asked if they had personally been 
diagnosed with influenza within the past 6 months (yes or no). Only 1 participant 
indicated previous experience with malaria, so the effect of that experience on choice was 
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not compared. General flu experience was high (54 of 84, 64%), but only 3 participants 
reported that they had been personally diagnosed with influenza recently and only 5 
participants reported that they did not have health insurance. Fisher’s exact tests were 
used for these dichotomous comparisons. Participants with general influenza experience 
chose treatment T significantly less often (10 out of 54, 18.5% chose T over N) than 
those who did not report any lifetime experience with influenza (12 out of 30, 40.0% 
chose T), Fisher’s Exact p = 0.031. It is possible that those without experience were less 
threatened by Treatment T’s longer duration of flu symptoms, but without further 
unplanned statistical tests it is unclear which aspects of Treatment T might have been 
more attractive to those without flu experience (See Table 2 for outcomes). Those with a 
recent personal influenza diagnosis chose treatment T about as often (1 out of 3 chose T, 
33.3%) as those without experience (21 out of 81 chose T, 29.5%), Fisher’s Exact p = 
0.603.  
In the mild disease task, those with health insurance chose treatment T about as 
often (N = 21, 26.9% chose T) as those without insurance (N=1, 16.7% chose T), Fisher’s 
Exact p = 0.501. For all participants, needle fear was not significantly different between 
those who chose Treatment T (n=22, M=3.55, SD=2.69) as those who chose N 
(n=62,M=2.81, SD=1.89),  t (28.71) =1.19, p = 0.244. Similarly, in the serious disease 
task, those with health insurance chose Treatment K about as often (n=36, 46.2% chose 
K) as those without health insurance (n=2, 33,3% chose K). Needle fear was not
significantly different between those who chose K (n=38, M=2.97, SD=1.87) and those 
who chose N (n = 46, M = 3.50, SD = 2.23), t (82) = -1.16, p=0.250. 
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Experiment 2 Discussion and Comparison with Experiment 1 
Experiment 2 replicated the predictive results of Experiment 1, showing that a 
model with only mid-choice feelings towards alternatives was either the most predictive 
or equally predictive to a less parsimonious model also including pre-choice outcome 
affect ratings. 
Coherence shifting received stronger support in Experiment 2, with some form of 
significant coherence shifting appearing in importance and affect ratings for both tasks. 
Experiment 2 serious disease affect scores replicated the general-form pattern of 
coherence shifting seen in the same task in Experiment 1. Effect sizes for coherence 
shifting were much larger in Experiment 2 in general than in Experiment 1. This is likely 
due to the influence of the unrelated reasoning task used as a distractor between ratings. 
However, it is notable that coherence shifting was still found in Experiment 1 without the 
distractor. 
The finding that coherence shifting depended on which treatment participants 
chose in Experiment 1 serious disease importance ratings was also found in Experiment 2 
mild disease importance ratings (See Figures 2 and 6). Participants who chose Treatment 
K in the Experiment 1 serious disease task and those who chose Treatment T in the 
Experiment 2 mild disease task generally did not significantly change their importance 
scores between the pre- and mid-choice times. Participants choosing M or N behaved in 
line with the strong form of coherence shifting. This finding is unexpected, especially 
given that participants facing the identical serious disease task in Experiment 2 showed 
coherence shifting for choosers of both treatments. The simple-effects ANOVAs for these 
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two tasks showed a significant main effect of treatment favored for those who did not 
shift scores (i.e., Treatment K and T choosers), and showed a large difference between 
attributes favoring each treatment at the pre-choice time. Alternatively, participants who 
showed coherence shifting had similar importance ratings for both types of attribute at 
the pre-choice time. This suggests that participants who were initially less conflicted, 
showing large differences in importance between attributes favoring each alternative, 
were more likely to choose one treatment (K or T) and did not need to shift their scores 
for that alternative to seem dominant. Participants who began the task feeling more 
conflicted were more likely to choose the other treatment (M or N) and shifted their 
scores to make that treatment more attractive.  
Between-task comparisons in Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 in that 
aversive feelings towards the decision as a whole were stronger in the more emotionally-
salient task, with scores being higher for the serious disease. This difference was found 
despite tasks in Experiment 2 threatening the same higher-level goals, supporting the 
prediction that increasing outcome unpleasantness also increases aversive feelings 
towards the task as a whole. More correlations were found between coherence shifting 
and emotion regulation strategies in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, but findings that 
coherence shifting was related to post-choice confidence were not replicated. 
Significant positive correlations between mild disease affect shifting and 
expressivity, which is a component of emotion regulation, run counter to the finding that 
higher coherence shifting did not significantly predict changes in physiological arousal. 
This is likely due to the higher reliability of self-report measures in this study (affect 
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ratings and the expressivity questionnaire) when compared to the physiological arousal 
measure. Skin conductance is highly sensitive and often reflects artifacts such as bodily 
movement and task-irrelevant arousal (Boucsein, 2012), and many participants were 
excluded due to potential recording errors. In addition, the analyses of physiological data 
were statistically underpowered when compared to the self-report measures, as the pilot 




The purpose of this dissertation was four-fold. The first goal was to examine what 
decision information best predicts choice in a difficult health tradeoff decision that would 
also elicit coherence shifting. This represents a new contribution to research on coherence 
shifting, as past studies have focused on the impact of early preference for one alternative 
or another on decision information ratings without examining the source of the initial 
leaning. This project also integrated years of research on the extent to which affective 
reactions predict choice. The second goal was to determine if coherence shifting occurs in 
disease-treatment shared-decision tasks. These tasks, which represent a recent and 
important field of decision-making, threaten higher-level goals and include more 
emotionally salient outcomes than the decision tasks used in prior research (e.g., the job 
task). In both of our studies, participants completed two decision tasks that differentially 
threatened higher-level goals (Experiment 1) or had higher outcome unpleasantness 
(Experiment 2). This led to a third goal—investigating whether the degree of coherence 
shifting changed as higher-level goals are more threatened or as outcomes become less 
pleasant. The fourth goal was to determine if coherence shifting served as a strategy to 
reduce task-related negative affect and if it corresponds with previously-identified 
emotion regulation strategies. These three research questions were investigated using 
three tasks, including a relatively emotionally-neutral job selection task used in prior 
research, a mild disease treatment choice that presented moderately unpleasant outcomes, 
and a serious disease treatment choice that presented highly unpleasant outcomes. The 
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disease tasks also threaten higher-level goals (e.g., health, survival) as opposed to 
relatively lower-level goals in the job task (e.g., comfort, convenience). 
Predicting Choice 
In Hypothesis 1, I predicted that final choice would best be predicted by a model 
including pre-choice affect towards outcomes and mid-choice feelings towards 
alternatives. (See Table 9 for a summary of results regarding the predictive analyses and 
coherence shifting within and across tasks.) Hypothesis 1 was only partially supported. In 
every decision scenario, a model only including mid-choice feelings towards alternatives 
either showed better fit or substantially equivalent fit to a model that included both pre-
choice affect ratings and mid-choice feeling towards alternatives. There was no case in 
which adding pre-choice affect ratings substantially improved model fit. This finding 
strongly supports the preference construction view of decision making and provides only 
weak support for the view of revealed preferences. Choice was best predicted by feelings 
towards alternatives after outcomes were presented in the decision context (e.g., arranged 
into two treatments). Under the revealed preferences conception of choice, participants 
should have based their decisions on their general predicted affect towards outcomes 
regardless of the decision context, combining or comparing their pre-existing feelings and 
reaching a decision that will match their overall preferences and long-term goals. The 
finding that preferences measured outside the decision context did not improve the 
prediction of participants’ choices is important for doctors and patients facing a shared 
treatment decision because it indicates that patients are strongly influenced by the 
presentation of decision information in the specific context of the alternatives given.   
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Table 9: Summary of Experiment 1 and 2 Results.
Study 1 Job Task 
Study 1 Serious 
Disease Task 
Study 2 Mild 
Disease Task 
Study 2 Serious 
Disease Task 
Prediction 
Best-Fit Model Model 2.0 Models 2.1 & 2.0 Models 2.0 & 2.1 Model 2.0 
AIC 99.05** 76.24** / 77.26** 68.39** / 68.45** 64.92** 
Coherence 
Shifting ηG2 ηG2 ηG2 ηG2 
Importance Shift 0.064** 0.016* 0.018* 0.025* 
Affect Shift 0.017 0.023* 0.060* 0.118** 
Between-Task 
Analyses M (SD) t M (SD) M (SD) t M (SD) 
Aversive 
Feelings  4.58 (1.86) 
<*





(0.069( ~ 0.052 (0.48) 0.084 (0.075) ~ 0.083 (0.069)
Affect ACS  
0.076 
(0.056) <* 0.110 (0.076) 0.101 (0.076) ~ 0.113 (0.082)
* p < .05, ** p < .001. ~ = Not significantly different. AIC = Akaike’s Information
Criterion. ACS = Absolute Coherence Shifting.
Based on model fit, there was essentially no support for any model including pre-
choice attribute importance, such as lexicographic and weighted additive (AIC 
differences from best-fitting model < 10; Burnham & Anderson, 2004). This suggests 
that even for decisions that strongly impact a person’s future (e.g., career or health), 
people may use fast, affect-based strategies over slower, more considered strategies that 
weigh the importance of various attributes. However, participants received no coaching 
in decision strategies. Doctors in real shared treatment decisions usually coach their 
patients to use an attribute-based strategy (lexicographic decision making; Elwyn et al., 
2012), and actual cancer patients have been found to prioritize different attributes based 
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on external life circumstances and goals (Wong et al., 2013). Also, the Wong et al. 
finding suggest an alternative interpretation of the predictive-analysis findings—that 
participants used fast heuristics because they were making a hypothetical decision. 
Research using decisions with real consequences for participants is needed to clarify this 
question.  
In summation, predictive analysis of all 4 tasks provided support for a preference 
construction view of decision-making and the use of affect as the primary decision-
making strategy over conceptions of revealed preferences and more cognitively-effortful 
importance-based strategies. 
Coherence Shifting  
Predictive analysis showed the impact of affect about decision alternatives on 
choice. Coherence shifting represents influence in the opposing direction, where an early 
preference towards one alternative will lead to changes in ratings of affect and 
importance for decision information. In Hypothesis 2, I predicted that participants would 
change ratings of affect towards outcomes and importance of attributes from the pre-
choice time (outside the decision context) to the mid-choice time (in the decision context) 
in a manner that makes the chosen alternative more attractive and the non-chosen 
alternative less attractive. Changes must exist between the pre- and mid-choice times in 
order for coherence shifting to be a mechanism for choice rather than post-decision 
shifting of scores (e.g., cognitive dissonance.)  
Importance Scores. There was general support for coherence shifting in 
importance scores across the four tasks in Experiments 1 and 2. Statistically significant 
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coherence shifting in some form was found in all four tasks. The evidence for coherence 
shifting of importance ratings was strongest for the job task and Study-2 serious disease 
task (see Table 9). In these tasks, participants increased sores for attributes that favored 
their choice and decreased scores (or increased them less strongly) for attributes that did 
not favor their choice. For the other two tasks, overall effect sizes were negligible and 
coherence shifting was only shown for participants who made one of the two possible 
choices.   
Affect Scores. The evidence for coherence shifting of outcome affect ratings was 
stronger in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, significant affect shifting 
was found for both tasks and effect sizes ranged from 0.06% to 0.12% of variance 
explained (see Table 9). In Study 1, effect sizes were lower and coherence shifting was 
not significant for the job task. This was probably due to the distractor tasks between 
measurement periods being inadvertently omitted in Experiment 1 but included in 
Experiment 2. The lack of distractor tasks in Experiment 1 may have allowed participants 
ratings at the mid- and post-choice measurement periods to be influenced by their 
memory of previous ratings. 
In the serious disease tasks for both studies, participants increased all affect 
ratings between the pre- and mid-choice times (main effect of time), but increased 
outcome ratings more sharply for their chosen treatment than for their non-chosen 
treatment. This represents the general form of coherence shifting, where affect ratings for 
outcomes of the non-chosen alternative do not decrease over time but increase less than 
outcomes of the chosen alternative. This pattern makes sense for the serious disease 
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tasks, where all outcomes were highly unpleasant. The main effect of time may represent 
a strategy of optimistically increasing ratings for all of these unpleasant outcomes when 
they are experienced in the context of a decision relative to the decontextualized non-
decision situation. An injection into the spinal fluid may seem less frightening when it is 
seen as part of an effective treatment for a serious disease than when it is contemplated 
alone. Participants did increase scores for their chosen treatment and decrease scores for 
their non-chosen treatment in the mild disease task, which showed higher outcome 
ratings in general than in the serious disease tasks. 
Hypothesis 3, concerning the relationship between the strength of coherence 
shifting and the corresponding sharpness of decrease in physiological arousal post-
shifting (aka a dose-response relationship), was not significantly supported in a pilot 
sample. This will be examined further in an upcoming publication. 
Between-Task and Exploratory Analysis  
In Hypothesis 4, I predicted that tasks that had more unpleasant outcomes and 
threatened higher level goals would lead to stronger aversive feelings. Carpenter and 
colleagues (Carpenter et al., 2016; Carpenter and Niedenthal, 2017) proposed that 
coherence shifting may serve as a strategy to reduce these aversive feelings rather than 
being purely a strategy to make fast or accurate decisions. This hypothesis was supported 
by comparisons between tasks in Experiments 1 and 2, which found that the task with 
more emotionally salient outcomes (serious disease in both experiments) and threatened 
higher-level goals (serious disease over job selection in Study 1) produced significantly 
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higher aversive feelings towards the decision as a whole than the less emotionally-salient 
tasks (job selection, mild disease).  
If coherence shifting serves to reduce aversive feelings, shifting of affect scores is 
likely a direct way to reduce negative affect and this could lead to different patterns of 
affect coherence shifting between tasks. Accordingly, I conducted an exploratory analysis 
comparing coherence shifting between tasks. A significant difference in overall affect 
shifting was found in in Experiment 1, where tasks differed in context, outcome salience, 
and level of goals threatened. No differences were found between Experiment 2 tasks, 
which shared a context and only differed in the unpleasantness of outcomes and the 
disease treated.  
In exploratory correlational analyses of Experiment 1, job task importance 
shifting was positively correlated with cognitive reappraisal (ERQ), which is a more 
cognitively effortful emotional regulation strategy then expressive suppression (Gross & 
John, 2003). Shifting importance scores may represent a more abstract or explicit 
cognitive strategy to regulate emotion than affect score shifting, making this strategy 
similar to cognitive reappraisal. However, in the serious disease treatment decision in 
Experiment 2, affect coherence shifting was correlated positively with multiple measures 
of emotional expressivity from the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire, such that 
participants who express negative emotions more openly and strongly engaged in 
stronger coherence shifting regarding affect towards outcomes. Shifting their affect 
ratings to reduce aversive feelings may be a more intuitive and effective emotion 
regulation method for people who feel and express their emotions more strongly. The 
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expressivity correlations found in the serious disease task did not replicate findings by 
Carpenter et al. (2016) in the job task, indicating that further replication may be 
necessary. 
Is Coherence Shifting a Bias? 
These findings fit together in a clear pattern. Participants in the current study 
shifted their ratings of affect towards outcomes and importance of attributes during 
decision making to align with their eventual final choice. Their final choice was predicted 
well by feelings towards the two choices during decision making and poorly by affect 
towards outcomes and importance ratings of attributes prior to decision making. By 
down-weighting pre-choice affect and importance ratings and engaging in coherence 
shifting, participants reduced aversive feelings towards the choices they made. 
Although coherence shifting may help participants feel better about their choices, 
it is not clear whether down-weighting initial preferences in order to construct new ones 
during decision making is adaptive. Coherence shifting can be characterized as people 
relying on initial hunches about their preferred choice rather than the actual strength of 
evidence. Thus, it could lead to decisions that do not align with a person’s long-term 
goals, especially given past research that has found that shifted preferences quickly revert 
to baseline preferences after a simulated decision (Simon et al., 2008; Simon & Spiller, 
2016). Imagine a person who is deciding between insulin injections and an oral 
medication for Type-2 diabetes and who, outside of the context of a treatment decision, 
strongly dislikes needles and is strongly motivated to reduce diabetes complications by 
reducing blood sugar. Because insulin is more effective at reducing blood sugar, this 
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person might develop an early preference for insulin during decision making, use 
coherence shifting to perceive injections as less negative and eventually choose insulin. 
This person might later find that in practice, his or her fear of needles is so strong that he 
or she does not comply regularly with the regular injections. 
Simon (2004) points out that coherence shifting can occur when people are 
judging whether a factual claim is true based on evidence as well as during preference 
decision making. Using the example of a jury making a judgment about the guilt of a 
defendant, he suggests that the strict reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases may 
encourage jurors to engage in coherence shifting when there is conflicting evidence 
regarding guilt. In this context, Simon characterizes coherence shifting as a bias.   
Cognitive Mechanisms of Coherence Shifting as Emotional Regulation 
These studies provided mixed correlational evidence that coherence shifting may 
serve as a strategy for emotion regulation. If shifting serves as a method to reduce 
negative emotions, then coherence shifting would be evidence that people engage in 
biased reasoning because they are trying to satisfy multiple goals: Reaching a decision 
with the highest future utility while also minimizing present, short-term negative affect. 
Marr (1982) would characterize this level of reasoning at the abstract computational 
level, representing the goals a person is trying to accomplish by engaging in coherence 
shifting. 
However, these results do not directly address the specific cognitive mechanisms 
by which coherence shifting reduces negative emotion, at Marr’s algorithmic level 
(1982). Some evidence was found for a positive relationship between strength of shifting 
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and decision confidence in Experiment 1. If participants were using effortful cognitive 
processes to increase confidence or justify their decision, then it is likely that they would 
have engaged in more shifting of relatively abstract attribute importance ratings than fast, 
affective outcome ratings. However, effect sizes were stronger for affect shifting in 
almost all tasks. In their third study, Carpenter et al. (2016) found less coherence shifting 
when people were depleted of regulatory resources, disrupting emotional processing. 
Future research could use secondary tasks that specifically tax cognitive resources to 
determine if systematic or affective processes underlie coherence shifting. 
Alternatively, participants may attempt to reduce negative emotion by reducing 
perceived risk. Risk is usually not considered in models of multi-attribute decision-
making, which generally treat outcomes as deterministic (Hastie & Dawes, 2010). 
However, both the simulated disease tasks in this experiment and real health decisions 
involve some level of uncertainty. Future experiments could measure perceived risk at 
multiple rating times or manipulate the probability of outcomes to examine well-studied 
biases in risky (probabilistic) decision-making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Impact and Contributions 
The experiments reported above provide multiple new contributions to the study 
of coherence shifting and preference construction, along with an avenue towards 
important applications. Coherence shifting was proposed by Simon et al. (Simon, 2004) 
as an example of a bi-directional interaction between choice and preferences, where an 
initial leaning towards a certain alternative in a difficult trade-off decision will lead to 
changes in perceived preferences to make that alternative more dominant. This is in the 
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opposite direction of many revealed-preference models, which suggest that stable long-
term preferences or revealed preferences for decision information are constructed 
unidirectionally into choice. In these experiments, I have examined changes in both of 
these directions, incorporating prior research on the construction of preferences from both 
prior and mid-decision affect. The predictive findings in both experiments provided 
support for preference construction as equal or superior to revealed or stable preferences 
for predicting choice, and that affect-based models have much stronger fit in predicting 
decisions than several more cognitively-effortful attribute-based decision strategies. 
These findings suggest that the initial leaning which participants will shift scores to 
support is based on affect towards alternatives as a whole, only assessed after that have 
seen outcomes within a decision context. 
These experiments have also replicated coherence shifting in shared health 
treatment decisions for a mild and a serious disease. These tasks are more emotionally 
salient than the job task (e.g., Simon et al., 2004; Carpenter et al., 2016) and mock-jury 
civil court tasks (Simon, 2004) utilized in prior coherence shifting experiments, and were 
designed to be specifically balanced on outcome unpleasantness rather than abstract task 
information. They also personally threaten higher-level goals such as health and survival, 
as opposed to a criminal jury who may be contemplating another person’s future. 
Coherence shifting appears to follow different patterns depending on the emotional 
salience of the outcomes and the level of goals threatened by the task (e.g., comfort vs. 
health and survival), which supports past findings in preference construction (Luce, 
1998). These findings were also replicated despite using more conservative and accurate 
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analyses and measures of effect size such as omnibus MANOVAS and generalized η2 
(Bakeman, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidel, 2018).  
In addition, these simulated disease tasks represent a first step towards applying 
coherence shifting findings to an important real-world decision context. These tasks were 
designed to share aspects with difficult health treatment tradeoff decisions using 
outcomes identified from real health treatments and diseases. These decisions are 
increasingly shared between patients and doctors (Elwyn et al., 2010; Makoul & 
Clayman, 2006), so understanding the impact of processes like coherence shifting is 
important to understanding how patients make these decisions.  
Given the suggestion earlier that coherence shifting is a cognitive bias, shared 
decision-making templates and tools could be designed to reduce coherence shifting 
engaged in by patients while still providing them with assurances that will reduce their 
aversive feelings and increase their confidence in the effectiveness of their selected 
treatment. For example, based on the correlation between affect-shifting and final 
decision confidence and the low tendency to utilize more effortful, attribute-based 
strategies, doctors could ask patients what attributes of a decision are more important to 
them before presenting them with the treatments in a decision context. In addition, 
decision tools could be designed that allow participants to engage in coherence shifting 
consciously and openly, indicating their initial preferences outside of a decision context 
and then actively and visibly changing those scores once the decision context has been 
presented. Such a decision tool may help patients and doctors avoid unconscious bias and 
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Appendix A: Instructions and Affect Scores for Tradeoff Development Pilot 
General Instructions 
In the following survey, you will be asked to place items into categories. This will 
include one long scale and several shorter scales. 
These scales are RELATIVE. This means that items only need to be higher or 
lower on the scale than items in the categories next to them. 
The directions WILL BE DIFFERENT for each question. Please read them each 
time. 
Figure A1: Pilot rating scales.  “I don’t know what this means” was not present in all scales. 
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Scale 1: Side Effects 
Instructions: “The following items represent possible side effects for treatments 
for a disease. Please drag these side effects into one of 7 categories based on your 
immediate emotional reaction to them. Scores closer to 7 mean more unpleasant. If you 
don't know the meaning of an item, please place it in the "I don't know what this means" 
group.” 
Original Scale Options: No side effects, Cough, Runny nose, Chills, Bruising, 
Congestion, Itching, Loss of appetite, Sore throat, Skin blemishes, Sweats, Indigestion, 
Blisters, Heartburn, Muscle cramping, Muscle spasms, Rash, Dizziness, Headache, Lack 
of coordination, Dehydration, Puffy face, Scarring, Bronchitis, Nausea, Tremors, Blood 
in stool, Cyst, High fever, Paranoia, Weakness in limbs, Prolonged double vision, 
Temporary hearing loss, Bone marrow loss, Tuberculosis 
Scale 2: Administration of Treatment 
Instructions: “The following items represent the administration methods for a 
variety of treatments for a disease. Please drag these items into 7 categories based on how 
unpleasant they would be to experience. Scores closer to 7 mean more unpleasant. If you 
don't know the meaning of an item, please place it in the "I don't know what this means" 
group.” 
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Original Scale Options: One pill only, One pill per day for 10 days, One pill 
immediately then one pill each at 6 24 and 48 hours later, One pill 3 times a day for 14 
days, Ointment in nostrils 2 times per day for 5 days, 2 inhalations 2 times a day for 10 
days, One pill 2 times a day for 5 days, One pill per day for 30 days, Oral rinse once per 
hour for 3 hours, One injection per week for 3 weeks, One intramuscular shot, then one 
pill 2 times a day for 7 days, One intramuscular injection, One injection in the buttocks, 
IV drip 4 hours a day for 5 days, One injection into the spinal fluid, Continuous IV drip 
for 7 days, Immediate hospitalization 
Scale 3: Out-Of-Pocket Cost 
Instructions: “The following items represent the out-of-pocket costs of treatments 
for a disease. This is the total amount you would personally need to pay, even if you have 
insurance. Please drag these items into 7 categories based on how you would feel if you 
had to pay that amount of money. Scores closer to 7 mean more unpleasant.” 
Original Scale Options: No cost, $7.00, $11.00, $20.00, $34.00, $60.00, $104.00, 
$180.00, $320.00, $550.00, $960.00, $2,900.00, $1,700.00, $8,900.00, $15,500.00, 
$5,100.00 
Scale 4: Duration of Symptoms 
Instructions: “The following items represent the time that you will still feel 
disease symptoms over the course of treatment. Please drag these items into 7 categories 
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based on how unpleasant they would be to experience. Scores closer to 7 mean more 
unpleasant.” 
Original Scale Options: 12 hours, 24 hours, 48 hours, 5 days, 7 days, 14 days, 10 
days, 1 day of hospitalization, 3 weeks, 1 month, 3 days of hospitalization, 7 days of 
hospitalization, 2 months, 1 month of hospitalization 
Scale 5: Efficacy 
Instructions: “The following items represent the efficacy of a treatment, or chance 
you will be cured of a disease after 7 days. Please drag these items into 7 categories based 
on how you would feel if you were offered a treatment with this efficacy. Scores closer to 
7 mean more unpleasant.” 
Original Scale Options: 99%, 95%, 91%, 83%, 87%, 71%, 79%, 75%, 63%, 67%, 
55%, 59%, 47%, 51%, 43% (same as without treatment) 
Scale 6: Mortality 
Instructions: “The following items represent the mortality rate, or that people will 
die from a disease even if they have received a treatment. 
Please drag these items into 7 categories based on how you would feel if you were 
offered a treatment with this mortality rate. Scores closer to 7 mean more unpleasant.” 
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Original Scale Items: 0.00%, 0.50%, 2.00%, 3.50%, 5.00%, 6.50%, 8.00%, 




Appendix B: Predictive Models of Choice 
The following regression models examine predictors of choice that are relevant to 
specific proposed conscious or unconscious strategies of decision making. These models 
are all based on simplifying assumptions and do not represent the full process of decision 
making proposed by each theory. This is necessary due to several statistical and 
methodological concerns. First, choice is only recorded at the person level. It is possible 
to distinguish between predictors in any give category (outcomes, attributes) at a 
between-subjects level, but the effect of these predictors on choice cannot be 
distinguished at a within-subjects level. For example, I might find that the importance of 
side effects is more predictive of choice across all participants than the importance of 
efficacy, but I cannot say that side effect importance was more predictive than efficacy 
for one person’s final choice. This prevents modeling any processes where participants 
do not use all decision information, such as the lexicographic decision-making (Hastie & 
Dawes, 2010) or stochastic threshold models such as the diffusion decision model 
(Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Second, multiple self-report measures of affect and 
importance are likely too slow and explicit to capture rapid attentional or neurobiological 
processes like the diffusion decision model and somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara and 
Damasio, 2005).  
This appendix includes the four primary models of interest, necessary statistical 
variations, and an explanation of simplifying assumptions for each model. The following 
models use notation for a decision between 2 alternatives (A & B) described through 8 
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outcomes within 4 attributes. See Table B1 below for this decision in a matrix form along 
with a summary of measures.  
Table B1: Decision Matrix. 
(Measure) Alternative A (Measure) Alternative B (Measure) 
Attribute 1 (Importance1) Outcome A1 (AffectA1) Outcome B1 (AffectB1) 
Attribute 2 (Importance2) Outcome A2 (AffectA2) Outcome B2 (AffectB2) 
Attribute 3 (Importance3) Outcome A3 (AffectA3) Outcome B3 (AffectB3) 
















Model 1: Affect Heuristic (Outcome Based) 
This model is based on risky decision research by Charpentier et al. 
(2016), who found that predicted happiness towards monetary outcomes rated prior to 
any decision predicted choice more reliably than the values themselves or values 
transformed according to known influences on decision-making (e.g., framing effects). In 
the context of this project, this corresponds to affect towards the 8 outcomes rated at the 
pre-choice time, producing the following model. (An aggregated version of this model, 
Model 1.1, will be examined under Model 2.) 
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� =  β0 +  β1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 +  β2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 +  β3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3 +  β4𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4
+ β5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵1 +  β6𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵2 +  β7𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵3 +  β8𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵4
where PA is the probability of choosing Alternative A, (1 - PA) is the probability 
of choosing Alternative B, and each Affect term is affect towards an outcome in Table 
B1. 
Model 2: Affect Heuristic (Outcomes and Alternatives) 
Schlösser et al. (2013) measured positivity, arousal, and dominance 
towards both outcomes and alternatives. They found that a model using affect towards 
alternatives was strongly predictive of choice and was not significantly improved by the 
addition of outcomes as predictors. Additionally, they found that the relationship between 
outcome affect and choice was mediated by affect towards alternatives. The first two 
comparisons are relatively easy to replicate. First, Model 1 will be compared with a 
model containing only feelings towards alternatives A and B: 
Model 2.0: Only Alternatives 
ln � 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
1−𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
� =  β0 + β1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β3𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + β4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 + β5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 +
β6𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵  
where Pos, Aro, Dom are Positivity, Arousal, and Dominance ratings for 
Alternatives A or B. 
Model 2.0 could be compared with a model including these 6 alternative ratings 
and the 8 outcome affect ratings: 
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� =  β0 +  β1−4(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1−4) + β5𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β6𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β7𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴
+ β8−11(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵1−4) + β12𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 + β13𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 + β14𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵
Mediation analysis is more difficult. Including all possible outcome-by-alternative 
affect mediation terms would result in a model that is difficult to interpret and 
inappropriate given the lack of attribute- or outcome-level within-person variance in final 
choice. Also, positivity, arousal, and dominance are sufficiently different constructs that 
they are not easy to aggregate. Schlösser et al. (2013) simplified their model by 
conducting cluster analysis on alternative ratings and using cluster membership as 
predictors. To reduce the complexity of the model and still differentially examine the 
impact of positivity, arousal, and dominance, affect towards outcomes will be aggregated 









A model using only these two aggregate terms as predictors will be compared 
with model 1 to determine if using these aggregate terms results in a loss of fit or 
explained variance. 




� =  β0 +  β1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + β2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 
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For all tasks in both experiments, Model 1.1 showed substantially worse fit than 
model 1.0, making it inappropriate to examine interactions using aggregated terms. Two 
additional models are proposed to examine the interaction between pre-choice 
alternatives, but were not utilized for either experiment: 




� =  β0 +  β1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + β2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β4𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + β5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 + β6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵
+ β7𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 + β8𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵
These models can be compared with a model aggregated outcome terms, feelings 
towards alternatives, and six alternative by outcome interaction terms: 




� =  β0 +  β1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + β2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β4𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + β5(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)
+ β6(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) + β7(𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) + β8𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 + β9𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵
+ β10𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 + β11𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 + β12(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵) + β13(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵)
+ β14(𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵)
According to the findings of Schlösser et al. (2013), with some theoretical support 
from stochastic and affective choice construction models, Model 2.3 should show the best 
performance and interaction terms should be significant predictors of choice. 
Model 3: Attribute-Based Decision Strategies 
Lexicographic decision making and elimination by aspects (see Hastie & 
Dawes, 2010) both rely on selecting the most important attribute before examining 
outcomes to make a decision. This fits with the shared decision making instructions from 
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Elwyn et al (2012), who instruct patients to think about what is most important to them. 
These decision-making strategies include a temporal sequence for prioritizing 
information in decision-making. A person first examines the most important attribute and 
then either selects the alternative with the best outcome (lexicographic) or rejects 
alternatives with unacceptable outcomes (elimination by aspects). Thresholds for 
“winning,” “unacceptable,” or “acceptable” are subjective and not defined here. If a 
choice cannot be reached through one alternative with these methods, the person then 
makes comparisons on the second most important alternative. First, a simplified model 
using only the 4 importance weights as predictors will be used to evaluate the impact of 
attribute importance in general. 




� =  β0+ β1𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 + β2𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 +   β3𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3
+ β4𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4
where each Importance term represents an Attribute in Table B1. 
In order to examine lexicographic decision making, a model using only the two 
affect outcome ratings for the attribute rated most important for each participant. If more 
than one attribute receives the highest importance rating, the outcome ratings for those 
attributes will be averaged. 




� =  β0 + β1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀 + β2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀 
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Model 4: Weighted Additive Strategy 
The weighted additive strategy instructs that importance weights for attributes 
should be multiplied by utility ratings for outcomes, and these products should be 
summed for alternatives to produce overall alternative scores (Hastie & Dawes, 2010), 
but without being instructed participants cannot be assumed to use this exact process. 
Instead, a model representing weighted additive will include 8 outcomes ratings, 4 
attribute importance ratings, and 8 outcome-by-attribute interaction terms. (It is necessary 
to keep the 12 main effect terms in the model to assess the interactions.) If using 
importance to weight outcome affect ratings is the most common decision-making 
method, this model should explain the most variance. In order to examine the interaction, 
we must first examine a model only including main effects. This is a combination of 
Models 1.0 and 3.0:  




� =  β0 +  β1−4(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1−4) +  β5−8(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1−4)
+ β9−12(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵1−4)
Adding the interaction terms provides the full weighted additive model  (next 
page): 





� =  β0 +  β1−4(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1−4) +  β5−8(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1−4)
+ β9−12(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵1−4) + β13(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1)
+ β14(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵1) + β15(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2)
+ β16(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵2) + β17(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3)
+ β18(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵3) + β19(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4)
+ β20(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵4)
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Appendix C: Experiment 1 Predictive Analysis Regression Coefficients 
Table C1.1: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Serious disease pre- and mid-choice affect models. 
Model 1: Affect (Charpentier) Model 2.0: Affect (Mid-choice) Model 2.1: Affect (Schlösser) 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
K Admin -0.09 0.09 0.92 [0.77,1.08] - - - - -0.13 0.20 0.88 [0.57,1.31] 
K Side Effects -0.08 0.23 0.92 [0.58,1.43] - - - - 0.37 0.51 1.45 [0.52,4.09] 
K Efficacy -0.21 0.13 0.81 [0.62,1.03] - - - - -0.57 0.31 0.57 [0.29,0.98] 
K Duration -0.05 0.12 0.95 [0.75,1.20] - - - - 0.33 0.26 1.39 [0.85,2.47] 
M Admin 0.19* 0.09 1.20 [1.01,1.46] - - - - 0.57* 0.24 1.77 [1.17,3.05] 
M Side Effects 0.05 0.14 1.05 [0.78,1.39] - - - - -0.15 0.39 0.86 [0.39,1.88] 
M Efficacy 0.15 0.14 1.16 [0.89,1.54] - - - - 0.54 0.32 1.71 [0.95,3.41] 
M Duration -0.09 0.08 0.92 [0.77,1.08] - - - - -0.51* 0.21 0.60 [0.38,0.86] 
K Positivity - - - - 1.42** 0.30 4.14 [2.45,8.18] 2.02** 0.49 7.53 [3.36,24.02] 
K Arousal - - - - 0.66* 0.27 1.93 [1.17,3.50] 0.77* 0.38 2.16 [1.09,5.01] 
K Dominance - - - - 0.73** 0.23 2.08 [1.37,3.38] 0.96** 0.32 2.61 [1.49,5.39] 
M Positivity - - - - -0.97** 0.32 0.38 [0.19,0.66] -1.51** 0.50 0.22 [0.07,0.50]
M Arousal - - - - -0.87** 0.32 0.42 [0.21,0.75] -0.86* 0.40 0.42 [0.17,0.87] 
M Dominance - - - - -0.56* 0.25 0.57 [0.34,0.92] -0.92* 0.37 0.40 [0.17,0.78] 
Constant -0.32 0.92 0.73 [0.11,4.32] -2.79 1.75 0.06 [0.00,1.68] 0.62 2.68 1.87 [0.01,544.14] 
N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. 
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Table C1.2: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Serious disease pre-choice attribute-based models. 
Model 3.0: Attribute-based Model 3.1: Lexicographic 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
K Admin - - - - - - - -
K Side Effects - - - - - - - -
K Efficacy - - - - - - - -
K Duration - - - - - - - -
M Admin - - - - - - - -
M Side Effects - - - - - - - -
M Efficacy - - - - - - - -
M Duration - - - - - - - -
Admin Importance -0.13 0.12 0.88 [0.69,1.10] - - - -
Side Effect Importance 0.31 0.17 1.36 [0.99,1.94] - - - -
Efficacy Importance -0.34 0.18 0.71 [0.49,1.02] - - - -
Duration Importance 0.17 0.14 1.18 [0.91,1.55] - - - -
K Important Outcome - - - - -0.44** -0.44 0.64 [0.50,0.79]
M Important Outcome - - - - 0.46** 0.46 1.58 [1.19,2.18]
Constant -0.32 1.61 0.72 [0.03,17.01] -0.02 -0.02 0.98 [0.53,1.82]
N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. 
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Table C1.3: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Serious disease pre-choice weighted additive models. 
Model 4.0: W.Add  (main effects) Model 4.1: W.Add (interaction) 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
K Admin -0.05 0.09 0.95 [0.80,1.14] -0.28 0.31 0.76 [0.40,1.38] 
K Side Effects -0.19 0.25 0.82 [0.50,1.32] -2.74 1.88 0.06 [0.00,1.78] 
K Efficacy -0.26* 0.13 0.77 [0.59,0.99] 0.67 1.00 1.95 [0.28,15.97] 
K Duration 0.00 0.12 1.00 [0.78,1.28] 1.24* 0.62 3.46 [1.08,12.73] 
M Admin 0.16 0.10 1.18 [0.97,1.44] -0.72 0.41 0.49 [0.20,1.03] 
M Side Effects 0.07 0.15 1.07 [0.78,1.43] 0.54 0.85 1.72 [0.31,9.13] 
M Efficacy 0.19 0.15 1.21 [0.91,1.63] -0.41 1.12 0.66 [0.06,5.79] 
M Duration -0.06 0.09 0.94 [0.78,1.13] -0.49 0.42 0.61 [0.26,1.36] 
Admin Importance -0.12 0.13 0.89 [0.68,1.15] 0.25 0.24 1.29 [0.83,2.15] 
Side Effect Importance 0.29 0.18 1.34 [0.96,1.92] 1.79 1.15 6.00 [0.85,72.26] 
Efficacy Importance -0.34 0.20 0.71 [0.48,1.04] -0.20 0.39 0.82 [0.38,1.79] 
Duration Importance 0.16 0.16 1.17 [0.86,1.62] -0.53 0.40 0.59 [0.25,1.25] 
K Admin x Importance - - - - 1.21 2.36 3.35 [0.03,386.12] 
K Side Effects x Importance - - - - 15.39 11.97 4.83*106 [0.00,3.53*1017] 
K Efficacy x Importance - - - - -4.79 5.30 0.01 [0.00,227.80] 
K Duration x Importance - - - - -10.20* 4.74 0.00 [0.00,0.25] 
M Admin x Importance - - - - -6.89* 3.09 0.00 [0.00,0.28] 
M Side Effects x Importance - - - - 2.92 5.58 18.54 [0.00,1,187,352.30] 
M Efficacy x Importance - - - - -3.01 6.13 0.05 [0.00,6,579.19] 
M Duration x Importance - - - - -4.08 3.15 0.02 [0.00,6.91] 
Constant -0.15 1.82 0.86 [0.02,31.43] -10.77 9.33 0.00 [0.00,267.10] 
N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. W.Add = Weighted Additive. 
113
Table C2.1: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Job task pre- and mid-choice affect models. 
Model 1: Affect (Charpentier) Model 2.0: Affect (Mid-choice) Model 2.1: Affect (Schlösser) 
Predictors  B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
Splendor Salary -0.30* 0.14 0.74 [0.56,0.96] - - - - -0.13 0.20 0.88 [0.57,1.31] 
Splendor Office -0.29 0.17 0.75 [0.52,1.01] - - - - 0.37 0.51 1.45 [0.52,4.09] 
Splendor 
Vacation -0.22* 0.11 0.80 [0.64,0.99] - - - - -0.57 0.31 0.57 [0.29,0.98] 
Splendor 
Commute -0.08 0.15 0.92 [0.68,1.24] - - - - 0.33 0.26 1.39 [0.85,2.47] 
BB Salary 0.52** 0.17 1.69 [1.23,2.41] - - - - 0.57* 0.24 1.77 [1.17,3.05] 
BB Office 0.23 0.13 1.26 [0.98,1.66] - - - - -0.15 0.39 0.86 [0.39,1.88] 
BB Vacation 0.13 0.15 1.14 [0.86,1.56] - - - - 0.54 0.32 1.71 [0.95,3.41] 
BB Commute 0.25 0.13 1.28 [1.00,1.68] - - - - -0.51* 0.21 0.60 [0.38,0.86] 
K Positivity - - - - 1.42** 0.30 4.14 [2.45,8.18] - - - -
K Arousal - - - - 0.66* 0.27 1.93 [1.17,3.50] - - - -
K Dominance - - - - 0.73** 0.23 2.08 [1.37,3.38] 2.02** 0.49 7.53 [3.36,24.02] 
M Positivity - - - - -0.97** 0.32 0.38 [0.19,0.66] 0.77* 0.38 2.16 [1.09,5.01] 
M Arousal - - - - -0.87** 0.32 0.42 [0.21,0.75] 0.96** 0.32 2.61 [1.49,5.39] 
M Dominance - - - - -0.56* 0.25 0.57 [0.34,0.92] -1.51** 0.50 0.22 [0.07,0.50] 
Constant -0.76 0.82 0.47 [0.09,2.31] -2.79 1.75 0.06 [0.00,1.68] -0.86* 0.40 0.42 [0.17,0.87] 
N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
114
Table C2.2: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Job task pre-choice attribute-based models. 
Model 3.0: Attribute-based Model 3.1: Lexicographic 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
Splendor Salary - - - - - - - -
Splendor Office - - - - - - - -
Splendor Vacation - - - - - - - -
Splendor Commute - - - - - - - -
BB Salary - - - - - - - -
BB Office - - - - - - - -
BB Vacation - - - - - - - -
BB Commute - - - - - - - -
Salary Importance -0.03 0.20 0.97 [0.66,1.44] - - - -
Office Importance -0.12 0.15 0.89 [0.65,1.20] - - - -
Vacation Importance 0.31* 0.15 1.37 [1.02,1.87] - - - -
Commute Importance 0.05 0.13 1.05 [0.83,1.35] - - - -
Splendor Important Outcome - - - - -0.10 -0.10 0.90 [0.74,1.10] 
BB Important Outcome - - - - 0.07 0.07 1.07 [0.89,1.30] 
Constant -1.79 1.77 0.17 [0.00,5.18] -0.71** -0.71 0.49 [0.28,0.82] 
N = 112. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. 
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Table C2.3: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Job task pre-choice weighted additive models. 
Model 4.0: W.Add (main effects) Model 4.1: W.Add (interaction) 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
Splendor Salary -0.35* 0.15 0.70 [0.51,0.93] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
Splendor Office -0.28 0.17 0.76 [0.52,1.05] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
Splendor Vacation -0.20 0.11 0.82 [0.65,1.01] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
Splendor Commute -0.14 0.16 0.87 [0.64,1.19] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
BB Salary 0.60** 0.19 1.82 [1.29,2.73] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
BB Office 0.20 0.14 1.22 [0.94,1.62] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
BB Vacation 0.07 0.16 1.08 [0.79,1.49] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
BB Commute 0.34* 0.17 1.40 [1.02,2.00] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
Salary Importance -0.11 0.24 0.89 [0.55,1.44] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
Office Importance -0.09 0.18 0.92 [0.64,1.32] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
Vacation Importance 0.18 0.18 1.20 [0.84,1.73] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
Commute Importance 0.30 0.18 1.35 [0.96,1.97] -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] 
Splendor Salary x Importance - - - - 1.69 7.15 5.41 [0.00,4.83x106] 
Splendor Office x Importance - - - - 8.35 5.58 4,249.12 [0.10,4.62x108] 
Splendor Vacation x Importance - - - - 2.62 3.55 13.78 [0.01,15,120.54] 
Splendor Commute x Importance - - - - -13.25** 5.12 0.00 [0.00,0.02] 
BB Salary x Importance - - - - -3.10 7.89 0.04 [0.00,3.61x105] 
BB Office x Importance - - - - 0.86 4.13 2.37 [0.00,9,129.14] 
BB Vacation x Importance - - - - -4.83 3.83 0.01 [0.00,13.23] 
BB Commute x Importance - - - - 1.03 3.65 2.81 [0.00,5,338.29] 
Constant -2.15 2.09 0.12 [0.00,6.58] -0.05 6.37 0.95 [0.00,2.23x105] 
N = 112. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. W.Add = Weighted Additive. 
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Appendix D: Experiment 1 (Serious Disease and Job) Coherence Shifting and Exploratory Statistics. 
Table D1.1: Coherence shifting of serious disease importance scores by choice, time, and favored treatment: MANOVA results. 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 
3-way (Choice by Time by Favored) 0.066 4.11* 2, 116 0.019 0.016 
2-way (Choice by Time) 0.154 10.52** 2, 116 <.001 0.042 
2-way (Choice by Favored) 0.043 2.59 2, 116 0.079 0.010 
2-way (Time by Favored) 0.060 3.73* 2, 116 0.027 0.015 
Choice (Main Effect) 0.001 0.04 2, 116 0.962 0.000 
Time (Main Effect) 0.572 77.43** 2, 116 <.001 0.237 
Favored Treatment (Main Effect) 0.572 77.43** 2, 116 <.001 0.026 
N = 119. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. 
Table D1.2: Coherence shifting of serious disease importance scores: Simple-effects univariate tests. 
2-way (Time by Favored) Time    Treatment Favored (K vs M) 
Univariate N F Df p ηG2 F Df p ηG2 F df p ηG2 
Chose K 77 2.12 1, 76 0.150 0.014 0.035 1, 76 0.852 0.000 28.87** 1, 76 <.001 0.160 
Chose M 42 5.40* 1, 41 0.025 0.062 4.60* 1, 41 0.038 0.053 2.88 1, 41 0.097 0.034 
N = 119. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. 
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Table D2.1: Coherence shifting of serious disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Interactions. 
3-way (Choice by Time by Treatment) 2-way (Choice by Time)
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 
Affect 0.089 2.89* 4, 119 0.023 0.023 0.135 4.65* 4, 119 0.002 0.036 
Univariate F Df p ηG2 F Df p ηG2 
Admin 1.43 1, 122 0.233 1.43 0.002 10.76* 1, 122 0.001 0.042 
Side Effects 1.22 1, 122 0.272 1.22 0.002 0.07 1, 122 0.786 0.000 
Efficacy 0.12 1, 122 0.731 0.12 0.000 5.33* 1, 122 0.023 0.011 
Duration 9.20* 1, 122 0.003 9.20 0.015 3.20 1, 122 0.076 0.011 
2-way (Choice by Treatment) 2-way (Time by Treatment)
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p Pillai’s Trace F Df P ηG2 
Affect 0.039 1.21 4, 119 0.312 0.009 0.454 24.74** 4, 119 <.001 0.162 
Univariate F df p ηG2 F Df P ηG2 
Admin 0.00 1, 122 0.967 0.000 5.10* 1, 122 0.026 0.006 
Side Effects 0.86 1, 122 0.356 0.001 22.06** 1, 122 <.001 0.033 
Efficacy 2.22 1, 122 0.139 0.005 90.22** 1, 122 <.001 0.068 
Duration 1.90 1, 122 0.171 0.003 0.40 1, 122 0.526 0.001 
N = 124. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared, K = Treatment K, M = Treatment M. See table 3 for specific outcomes. 
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Table D2.2: Coherence shifting of serious disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Main effects. 
Choice     Time 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df P ηG2 
Affect 0.004 0.45 4, 119 0.770 0.004 0.819 134.81** 4, 119 <.001 0.513 
Univariate F df p ηG2 F Df P ηG2 
Admin 0.00 1, 122 0.990 0.000 73.75** 1, 122 <.001 0.224 
Side Effects 1.11 1, 122 0.294 0.002 161.86** 1, 122 <.001 0.366 
Efficacy 0.75 1, 122 0.389 0.002 362.78** 1, 122 <.001 0.427 
Duration 0.55 1, 122 0.461 0.001 23.69** 1, 122 <.001 0.078 
N = 124. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared, K = Treatment K, M = Treatment M. See Table 3 for specific outcomes. 
Multivariate Treatment (K vs M) 
Affect Pillai’s Trace F df p ηG2 
Univariate 0.353 16.26** 4, 119 <.001 0.113 
Admin F Df p ηG2 
Side Effects 5.64* 1, 122 0.019 0.008 
Efficacy 25.86** 1, 122 <.001 0.042 
Duration 6.59* 1, 122 0.011 0.016 
Multivariate 41.28* 1, 122 <.001 0.062 
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 Table D3: Coherence shifting of job task importance scores by choice, time, and job favored: MANOVA results. 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 
3-way (Choice by Time by Favored) 0.222 16.36** 2, 115 <.001 0.064 
2-way (Choice by Time) 0.110 7.13* 2, 115 0.001 0.028 
2-way (Choice by Favored) 0.017 0.99 2, 115 0.374 0.004 
2-way (Time by Favored) 0.213 15.57** 2, 115 <.001 0.057 
Choice (Main Effect) 0.032 1.93 2, 115 0.150 0.008 
Time (Main Effect) 0.612 90.70** 2, 115 <.001 0.261 
Job Favored (Main Effect) 0.009 0.52 2, 115 0.596 0.002 
N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. 
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Table D4.1: Coherence shifting of job task affect scores by choice, time, and job: Interactions. 
3-way (Choice by Time by Job) 2-way (Choice by Time)
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df P ηG2 
Affect 0.073 2.22 4, 113 0.072 0.017 0.298 12.00** 4, 113 <.001 0.092 
Univariate F Df p ηG2 F Df p ηG2 
Salary 0.37 1, 116 0.545 0.001 14.90** 1, 116 <.001 0.058 
Office 5.53* 1, 116 0.020 0.006 14.24** 1, 116 <.001 0.071 
Vacation 1.21 1, 116 0.273 0.001 4.85* 1, 116 0.030 0.023 
Commute 2.54 1, 116 0.114 0.003 6.05* 1, 116 0.015 0.026 
2-way (Choice by Job) 2-way (Time by Job)
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df P ηG2 
Affect 0.057 1.69 4, 113 0.156 0.013 0.299 12.06** 4, 113 <.001 0.084 
Univariate F df p ηG2 F Df P ηG2 
Salary 0.67 1, 116 0.414 0.001 14.90** 1, 116 <.001 0.020 
Office 3.74 1, 116 0.056 0.004 5.85* 1, 116 0.017 0.007 
Vacation 0.58 1, 116 0.446 0.001 4.72* 1, 116 0.032 0.004 
Commute 0.60 1, 116 0.440 0.001 22.98** 1, 116 <.001 0.026 
N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. Spl. = Splendor, BB = Bonnie’s Best 
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Table D4.2: Coherence shifting of job task affect scores by choice, time, and job: Main effects. 
Choice     Time 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 
Affect 0.068 2.06 4, 113 0.091 0.016 0.938 427.01** 4, 113 <.001 0.765 
Univariate F df p ηG2 F Df p ηG2 
Admin 0.08 1, 116 0.783 0.000 873.50** 1, 116 <.001 0.773 
Side Effects 2.23 1, 116 0.138 0.002 627.56** 1, 116 <.001 0.757 
Efficacy 0.01 1, 116 0.910 0.000 183.18** 1, 116 <.001 0.468 
Duration 5.74* 1, 116 0.018 0.010 873.50** 1, 116 <.001 0.716 
Job (Spl vs BB) 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F df p ηG2 
Affect 0.176 6.04** 4, 113 <.001 0.044 
Univariate F Df p ηG2 
Admin 0.05 1, 116 0.829 0.000 
Side Effects 16.39** 1, 116 <.001 0.015 
Efficacy 0.18 1, 116 0.675 0.000 
Duration 4.36* 1, 116 0.039 0.005 
N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. Spl. = Splendor, BB = Bonnie’s Best 
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Table D5: Aversive feelings and overall strength of Coherence Shifting in the Serious Disease Task and the Job Task. 
Serious Disease  
Task Job Task 




samples t df P 
Anxious 5.90 (2.00) 4.67 (1.84) 0.371** 5.85** 105 < .001 
Stressed 5.98 (2.25) 4.81 (1.90) 0.476** 5.62** 105 < .001 
Unpleasant 6.12 (2.10) 3.92 (1.80) 0.338** 10.07** 105 < .001 
Conflicted 5.59 (2.40) 4.91 (1.88) 0.165 2.54* 105 0.012 
Coherence Shifting 
Importance 0.052 (0.048) 0.066 (0.069) 0.117 -1.91 105 0.058 
Affect 0.110 (0.092) 0.076 (0.056) -0.064 3.20* 105 0.002 
N = 106. * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
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Table D6: Descriptive statistics and correlations for Experiment 1 between-task and exploratory analysis. 
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Serious Imp. ACS 0.05 (0.05) 
2 Serious Affect ACS 0.11 (0.09) .006 
3 Job Imp. ACS 0.07 (0.07) .117 .104 
4 Job Affect ACS 0.08 (0.06) -.238* -.064 .112 
5 BEQ Negative Emotionality 22.27 (6.06) -.019 -.049 .071 .100 
6 BEQ Positive Emotionality 21.15 (3.72) .123 .190 .009 .095 .584** 
7 BEQ Impulse Strength 26.75 (8.08) .060 -.058 -.063 -.083 .468** .339** 
8 BEQ Overall 70.17 (14.43) .057 -.004 -.003 .020 .832** .692** .844** 
9 ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal 29.45 (5.12) .007 .227* .119 -.135 .020 .346** -.128 .026 
10 ERQ Expressive Suppression 14.12 (4.6) .049 -.082 -.063 -.117 -.696** -.678** -.311** -.641** -.213* 
11 Serious Choice Confidence 3.67 (0.81) -.009 .304** .150 -.009 -.088 -.031 -.061 -.079 .039 
12 Job Choice Confidence 4.15 (1.04) -.080 .155 .208* .022 -.008 -.092 -.108 -.087 .017 
13 Serious Confidence Change 0.41 (0.63) -.118 .104 .135 .043 .078 .181 -.081 .034 .064 
14 Job Confidence Change 0.56 (0.81) -.095 .105 .175 .125 .173 .150 -.012 .105 .153 
10 11 12 13 
11 Serious Choice Confidence .021 
12 Job Choice Confidence .082 .071 
13 Serious Confidence Change -.109 .302** .095 
14 Job Confidence Change -.157 -.008 .615** .170 
N = 106. * p < .05, ** p < .001, ACS = Absolute Coherence Shifting, Imp. = Importance, BEQ = Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire, 
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. 
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Appendix E: Experiment 2 Predictive Analysis Regression Coefficients 
Table E1.1: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Mild disease pre- and mid-choice affect models. 
Model 1: Affect (Charpentier) Model 2.0: Affect (Mid-choice) Model 2.1: Affect (Schlösser) 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
T Admin -0.15 0.15 0.86 [0.64,1.15] - - - - -0.12 0.26 0.89 [0.51,1.46] 
T Side Effects -0.32 0.26 0.73 [0.42,1.16] - - - - 0.30 0.48 1.36 [0.50,3.51] 
T Efficacy 0.03 0.25 1.03 [0.63,1.73] - - - - 0.40 0.45 1.49 [0.54,3.74] 
T Duration -0.55 0.29 0.58 [0.32,1.01] - - - - -1.20 0.65 0.30 [0.07,0.95] 
N Admin 0.13 0.12 1.14 [0.90,1.47] - - - - 0.45 0.29 1.56 [0.94,3.10] 
N Side Effects 0.19 0.21 1.21 [0.82,1.84] - - - - -0.06 0.37 0.94 [0.44,1.96] 
N Efficacy 0.26 0.19 1.30 [0.90,1.92] - - - - 0.62 0.35 1.86 [1.00,4.10] 
N Duration 0.10 0.12 1.10 [0.87,1.39] - - - - 0.24 0.23 1.27 [0.82,2.08] 
T Positivity - - - - 0.85** 0.30 2.35 [1.37,4.55] 1.29** 0.47 3.64 [1.65,11.04] 
T Arousal - - - - 0.34 0.33 1.40 [0.76,2.78] 0.18 0.37 1.20 [0.60,2.65] 
T Dominance - - - - 0.32 0.24 1.37 [0.87,2.26] 0.72* 0.36 2.05 [1.05,4.48] 
N Positivity - - - - -1.05** 0.34 0.35 [0.17,0.63] -1.06* 0.43 0.35 [0.13,0.72] 
N Arousal - - - - 0.23 0.31 1.26 [0.69,2.34] 0.55 0.45 1.74 [0.72,4.61] 
N Dominance - - - - -0.31 0.23 0.73 [0.46,1.13] -0.94* 0.47 0.39 [0.13,0.87] 
Constant -1.92 1.22 0.15 [0.01,1.52] -0.96 1.97 0.38 [0.01,18.02] -7.71* 3.89 0.00 [0.00,0.41] 
N = 90. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
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Table E1.2: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Mild disease pre-choice attribute-based models. 
Model 3.0: Attribute-based Model 3.1: Lexicographic 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
T Admin - - - - - - - -
T Side Effects - - - - - - - -
T Efficacy - - - - - - - -
T Duration - - - - - - - -
N Admin - - - - - - - -
N Side Effects - - - - - - - -
N Efficacy - - - - - - - -
N Duration - - - - - - - -
Admin Importance -0.22 0.15 0.81 [0.59,1.08] - - - -
Side Effect Importance -0.13 0.21 0.88 [0.57,1.33] - - - -
Efficacy Importance -0.13 0.19 0.87 [0.59,1.27] - - - -
Duration Importance 0.63** 0.21 1.87 [1.26,2.95] - - - -
T Important Outcome - - - - -0.18* -0.18 0.83 [0.69,0.97]
N Important Outcome - - - - 0.20 0.20 1.22 [0.99,1.54] 
Constant 0.09 2.34 1.10 [0.01,120.49] 1.20** 1.20 3.31 [1.98,5.98] 
N = 90. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
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Table E1.3: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Mild disease pre-choice Weighted Additive (W.Add) models. 
Model 4.0: W.Add (main effects) Model 4.1: W.Add (interaction) 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
T Admin -0.16 0.16 0.85 [0.61,1.16] 0.55 0.57 1.73 [0.58,5.76] 
T Side Effects -0.38 0.30 0.68 [0.36,1.15] 0.60 1.25 1.82 [0.15,23.11] 
T Efficacy 0.11 0.28 1.12 [0.64,1.95] 1.64 1.53 5.16 [0.32,154.42] 
T Duration -0.35 0.31 0.70 [0.38,1.28] 1.03 1.78 2.81 [0.08,98.78] 
N Admin 0.14 0.14 1.15 [0.88,1.54] 0.15 0.39 1.16 [0.56,2.71] 
N Side Effects 0.20 0.23 1.23 [0.79,1.96] 0.06 1.12 1.06 [0.13,10.28] 
N Efficacy 0.19 0.20 1.21 [0.82,1.82] 0.39 0.97 1.48 [0.22,11.19] 
N Duration 0.15 0.13 1.17 [0.91,1.52] 0.29 0.61 1.34 [0.42,4.97] 
Admin Importance -0.16 0.18 0.86 [0.58,1.22] -0.13 0.25 0.88 [0.51,1.42] 
Side Effect Importance -0.25 0.26 0.78 [0.46,1.27] -0.83 0.78 0.44 [0.08,1.94] 
Efficacy Importance -0.18 0.22 0.84 [0.53,1.29] 0.45 0.71 1.57 [0.44,7.89] 
Duration Importance 0.66* 0.26 1.93 [1.19,3.37] -0.23 1.34 0.79 [0.06,12.69] 
T Admin x Importance - - - - -5.85 4.59 0.00 [0.00,13.08] 
T Side Effects x Importance - - - - -8.01 10.43 0.00 [0.00,1.12*e5] 
T Efficacy x Importance - - - - -8.91 9.36 0.00 [0.00,2.13*e3] 
T Duration x Importance - - - - -10.31 13.38 0.00 [0.00,9.69*e6] 
N Admin x Importance - - - - 0.25 3.38 1.29 [0.00,1.85*e3] 
N Side Effects x Importance - - - - -1.57 9.06 0.21 [0.00,8.62*e6] 
N Efficacy x Importance - - - - 1.18 5.77 3.24 [0.00,4.81*e5] 
N Duration x Importance - - - - 1.32 4.84 3.73 [0.00,1.22*e5] 
Constant -1.92 2.92 0.15 [0.00,46.84] 2.08 10.45 8.01 [0.00,8.52*e9] 
N = 90. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. W.Add = Weighted Additive. Extreme values are in scientific notation. 
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Table E2.1: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Serious disease pre- and mid-choice affect models. 
Model 1: Affect (Charpentier) Model 2.0: Affect (Mid-choice) Model 2.1: Affect (Schlösser) 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
K Admin -0.06 0.10 0.94 [0.76,1.15] - - - - -0.27 0.26 0.76 [0.43,1.28] 
K Side Effects -0.35 0.32 0.71 [0.37,1.30] - - - - 1.14 0.65 3.13 [0.96,13.82] 
K Efficacy 0.06 0.15 1.06 [0.79,1.41] - - - - -0.14 0.38 0.87 [0.38,1.76] 
K Duration -0.21 0.13 0.81 [0.62,1.03] - - - - 0.31 0.28 1.37 [0.79,2.50] 
M Admin 0.26 0.16 1.29 [0.96,1.80] - - - - -0.15 0.30 0.86 [0.45,1.58] 
M Side Effects 0.19 0.19 1.22 [0.84,1.79] - - - - -1.27* 0.63 0.28 [0.06,0.80] 
M Efficacy 0.00 0.14 1.00 [0.76,1.30] - - - - 0.52 0.44 1.67 [0.76,4.64] 
M Duration 0.10 0.17 1.11 [0.80,1.55] - - - - 0.04 0.35 1.05 [0.52,2.15] 
K Positivity - - - - 1.40** 0.37 4.07 [2.15,9.53] 2.19** 0.65 8.92 [3.20,47.54] 
K Arousal - - - - 0.38 0.35 1.46 [0.74,3.05] 0.80 0.58 2.22 [0.76,8.26] 
K Dominance - - - - 0.13 0.26 1.14 [0.68,1.92] 0.45 0.36 1.57 [0.82,3.57] 
M Positivity - - - - -1.01** 0.30 0.37 [0.19,0.62] -1.91** 0.62 0.15 [0.03,0.40] 
M Arousal - - - - -0.24 0.35 0.79 [0.38,1.56] -0.48 0.47 0.62 [0.22,1.53] 
M Dominance - - - - -0.76* 0.30 0.47 [0.24,0.80] -1.34** 0.51 0.26 [0.07,0.60] 
Constant -0.36 1.24 0.70 [0.06,8.22] 0.76 2.05 2.14 [0.04,146.29] 4.25 3.44 70.25 [0.12,1.55•e5] 
N = 88. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
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Table E2.2: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Serious disease pre-choice attribute-based models. 
Model 3.0: Attribute-based Model 3.1: Lexicographic 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
K Admin - - - - - - - -
K Side Effects - - - - - - - -
K Efficacy - - - - - - - -
K Duration - - - - - - - -
M Admin - - - - - - - -
M Side Effects - - - - - - - -
M Efficacy - - - - - - - -
M Duration - - - - - - - -
Admin Importance -0.08 0.15 0.92 [0.68,1.24] - - - -
Side Effect Importance -0.11 0.17 0.90 [0.63,1.26] - - - -
Efficacy Importance -0.40* 0.18 0.67 [0.46,0.94] - - - -
Duration Importance 0.12 0.15 1.13 [0.84,1.54] - - - -
K Important Outcome - - - - -0.09 -0.09 0.91 [0.76,1.10]
M Important Outcome - - - - -0.10 -0.10 0.91 [0.71,1.15]
Constant 3.40 1.90 29.89 [0.80,1,437.88] -0.16 -0.16 0.85 [0.45,1.57]
N = 88. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. 
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Table E2.3: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Serious disease pre-choice Weighted Additive (W.Add) models. 
Model 4.0: W.Add (main effects) Model 4.1: W.Add (interaction) 
Predictors B SE B OR 95%CI OR B SE B OR 95%CI OR 
K Admin -0.05 0.11 0.95 [0.76,1.18] 0.30 0.46 1.35 [0.55,3.42] 
K Side Effects -0.51 0.35 0.60 [0.29,1.18] -0.11 1.75 0.89 [0.03,28.54] 
K Efficacy 0.16 0.16 1.17 [0.85,1.63] -0.62 0.86 0.54 [0.09,2.83] 
K Duration -0.16 0.14 0.86 [0.64,1.11] -1.28 0.67 0.28 [0.06,0.86] 
M Admin 0.23 0.16 1.26 [0.93,1.77] 0.21 0.43 1.23 [0.52,2.95] 
M Side Effects 0.16 0.22 1.17 [0.77,1.82] -0.80 0.93 0.45 [0.07,2.91] 
M Efficacy -0.06 0.15 0.94 [0.69,1.26] 1.16 0.75 3.18 [0.78,16.34] 
M Duration 0.19 0.20 1.21 [0.83,1.81] 0.50 0.71 1.65 [0.42,6.97] 
Admin Importance -0.18 0.20 0.84 [0.56,1.23] -0.26 0.35 0.77 [0.38,1.56] 
Side Effect Importance -0.04 0.19 0.96 [0.65,1.40] 0.05 1.32 1.05 [0.08,15.06] 
Efficacy Importance -0.44* 0.20 0.64 [0.43,0.93] -0.99** 0.37 0.37 [0.17,0.72] 
Duration Importance 0.06 0.17 1.07 [0.76,1.51] 0.86 0.62 2.37 [0.73,8.65] 
K Admin x Importance - - - - -3.12 3.58 0.04 [0.00,44.69] 
K Side Effects x Importance - - - - -4.94 14.51 0.01 [0.00,2.48•e10] 
K Efficacy x Importance - - - - 5.10 5.30 163.84 [0.01,1.01•e7] 
K Duration x Importance - - - - 9.23 4.89 10,208.62 [1.78,4.24•e8] 
M Admin x Importance - - - - 0.26 3.37 1.29 [0.00,1.07•e3] 
M Side Effects x Importance - - - - -8.54 7.39 0.00 [0.00,408.32] 
M Efficacy x Importance - - - - 7.79 4.66 2,416.59 [0.41,6.36•e7] 
M Duration x Importance - - - - 2.32 4.92 10.17 [0.00,2.09•e5] 
Constant 3.14 2.27 23.09 [0.30,2,383.15] 1.62 9.40 5.04 [0.00,7.71•e8] 
N = 88. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. W.Add = Weighted Additive. Extreme values are in scientific notation. 
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Appendix F: Experiment 2 (Mild and Serious Disease) Coherence Shifting, Skin Conductance, and Exploratory 
Statistics 
Table F1.1: Coherence shifting of Study 2 mild disease importance scores by choice, time, and favored treatment: MANOVA results 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 
3-way (Choice by Time by Favored) 0.075 3.55* 2, 88 0.033 0.018 
2-way (Choice by Time) 0.269 16.18** 2, 88 <.001 0.081 
2-way (Choice by Favored) 0.025 1.11 2, 88 0.335 0.006 
2-way (Time by Favored) 0.086 4.14* 2, 88 0.019 0.020 
Choice (Main Effect) 0.066 3.10 2, 88 0.050 0.016 
Time (Main Effect) 0.226 12.88** 2, 88 <.001 0.061 
Treatment Favored (Main Effect) 0.078 3.71* 2, 88 0.028 0.018 
N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. 
Table F1.2: Coherence shifting of mild disease importance scores: Simple-effects univariate tests. 
2-way (Time by Favored) Time Treatment Favored (K vs M) 
Univariate N F Df p ηG2 F Df p ηG2 F df p ηG2 
Chose T 24 0.01 1, 23 0.946 0.000 2.42 1, 23 0.133 0.050 8.95* 1, 23 0.007 0.163 
Chose N 67 15.52** 1, 66 <.001 0.105 0.66 1, 66 0.419 0.005 23.51** 1, 66 <.001 0.151 
N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. 
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Table F2.1: Coherence shifting of Study 2 mild disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Interactions. 
3-way (Choice by Time by Treatment) 2-way (Choice by Time)
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 
Affect 0.226 6.29** 4, 86 <.001 0.060 0.317 9.97** 4, 86 <.001 0.095 
Univariate F Df p ηG2 F Df p ηG2 
Admin 3.55 1, 89 0.063 0.005 8.36* 1, 89 0.005 0.049 
Side Effects 1.23 1, 89 0.270 0.002 3.31 1, 89 0.072 0.018 
Efficacy 6.41* 1, 89 0.013 0.010 4.19* 1, 89 0.044 0.016 
Duration 6.28* 1, 89 0.014 0.013 15.29** 1, 89 <.001 0.069 
2-way (Choice by Treatment) 2-way (Time by Treatment)
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df P ηG2 
Affect 0.022 0.49 4, 86 0.743 0.005 0.022 9.52** 4, 86 <.001 0.083 
Univariate F df p ηG2 F Df P ηG2 
Admin 0.37 1, 89 0.544 0.001 4.52* 1, 89 0.036 0.007 
Side Effects 0.19 1, 89 0.662 0.000 3.37 1, 89 0.070 0.006 
Efficacy 1.24 1, 89 0.269 0.002 19.65** 1, 89 <.001 0.031 
Duration 0.21 1, 89 0.648 0.001 17.18** 1, 89 <.001 0.033 
N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. 
132
Table F2.2: Coherence shifting of Study 2 mild disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Main effects. 
Choice     Time 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 
Affect 0.096 2.28 4, 86 0.067 0.022 0.907 209.44** 4, 86 <.001 0.666 
Univariate F df p ηG2 F Df P ηG2 
Admin 0.00 1, 89 0.957 0.000 15.93** 1, 89 <.001 0.085 
Side Effects 0.98 1, 89 0.324 0.002 40.5** 1, 89 <.001 0.177 
Efficacy 7.78* 1, 89 0.006 0.026 273.25** 1, 89 <.001 0.505 
Duration 0.16 1, 89 0.693 0.000 725.23** 1, 89 <.001 0.767 
Treatment (T vs N) 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F df p ηG2 
Affect 0.307 9.52** 4, 86 <.001 0.083 
Univariate F Df p ηG2 
Admin 1.06 1, 89 0.307 0.002 
Side Effects 0.57 1, 89 0.451 0.001 
Efficacy 2.77 1, 89 0.100 0.005 
Duration 33.44** 1, 89 <.001 0.078 
N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. 
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Table F3: Coherence shifting of Study 2 serious disease importance scores by choice, time, and favored treatment: MANOVA results. 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 
3-way (Choice by Time by Favored) 0.098 4.72* 2, 87 0.011 0.025 
2-way (Choice by Time) 0.139 7.03* 2, 87 0.002 0.037 
2-way (Choice by Favored) 0.042 1.89 2, 87 0.157 0.046 
2-way (Time by Favored) 0.054 2.48 2, 87 0.090 0.010 
Choice (Main Effect) 0.054 2.49 2, 87 0.089 0.013 
Time (Main Effect) 0.054 2.49 2, 87 0.089 0.013 
Treatment Favored (Main Effect) 0.174 9.14** 2, 87 <.001 0.046 
N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. 
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Table F4.1: Coherence shifting of Study 2 serious disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Interactions. 
3-way (Choice by Time by Treatment) 2-way (Choice by Time)
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 
Affect 0.368 12.52** 4, 86 <.001 0.118 0.234 6.58** 4, 86 <.001 0.062 
Univariate F Df p ηG2 F Df p ηG2 
Admin 14.17** 1, 89 <.001 0.024 7.26* 1, 89 0.008 0.035 
Side Effects 8.51* 1, 89 0.004 0.016 10.15* 1, 89 0.002 0.045 
Efficacy 14.66** 1, 89 <.001 0.019 1.20 1, 89 0.276 0.004 
Duration 5.47* 1, 89 0.022 0.010 5.15* 1, 89 0.026 0.025 
2-way (Choice by Treatment) 2-way (Time by Treatment)
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df P ηG2 
Affect 0.052 1.19 4, 86 0.321 0.011 0.353 11.73 4, 86 <.001 0.099 
Univariate F df p ηG2 F Df P ηG2 
Admin 1.53 1, 89 0.219 0.003 0.08 1, 89 0.780 0.000 
Side Effects 1.20 1, 89 0.277 0.002 9.33* 1, 89 0.003 0.017 
Efficacy 0.96 1, 89 0.329 0.003 22.28** 1, 89 <.001 0.028 
Duration 0.28 1, 89 0.601 0.001 26.14** 1, 89 <.001 0.045 
N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. 
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Table F4.2: Coherence shifting of Study 2 serious disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Main effects. 
Choice     Time 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F df p ηG2 Pillai’s Trace F Df p ηG2 
Affect 0.012 0.26 4, 86 0.902 0.002 0.817 95.73** 4, 86 <.001 0.473 
Univariate F df P ηG2 F Df p ηG2 
Admin 0.03 1, 89 0.860 0.000 150.19** 1, 89 <.001 0.419 
Side Effects 0.04 1, 89 0.844 0.000 161.70** 1, 89 <.001 0.417 
Efficacy 0.35 1, 89 0.554 0.001 181.42** 1, 89 <.001 0.367 
Duration 0.29 1, 89 0.595 0.000 4.93* 1, 89 0.029 0.023 
Treatment (K vs M) 
Multivariate Pillai’s Trace F df p ηG2 
Affect 0.565 27.87** 4, 86 <.001 0.207 
Univariate F Df p ηG2 
Admin 5.11* 1, 89 0.026 0.009 
Side Effects 32.08** 1, 89 <.001 0.054 
Efficacy 0.96 1, 89 0.329 0.003 
Duration 88.71** 1, 89 <.001 0.193 
N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. 
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Table F5: Regression coefficients and statistics effects of coherence shifting and time on skin conductance level. 
Mild Disease Task 
Parameter B SE (B) t (df) p 95%CI B 
Intercept 1.83 0.26 7.05** (14) < .001 [1.27, 2.38] 
Time (Quadratic) -0.20 0.05 -4.03** (14) < .001 [-0.30, -0.09]
zACSoverall 0.08 0.15 0.55 (14) 0.59 [-0.25, 0.41] 
Time (Linear) 0.84 0.19 4.32**(14) < .001 [0.42, 1.25] 
Time (linear) * zACS -0.03 0.12 -0.23 (14) 0.82 [-0.27, 0.22] 
Time (quadratic) * zACS 0.01 0.03 0.48 (14) 0.64 [-0.25, 0.08] 
N = 16. * p < .05. ** p < .001. zACSoverall = overall absolute coherence shifting of affect and importance scores. 
Serious Disease Task 
Parameter B SE (B) t (df) p 95%CI B 
Intercept 2.13 0.27 7.85** (11.94) < .001 [1.54, 2.72] 
Time (Quadratic) -0.14 0.04 -3.36* (5.97) 0.02 [-0.24, -0.04] 
zACSoverall 0.15 0.16 0.95 (11.94) 0.36 [-0.19, 0.50] 
Time (Linear) 0.58 0.17 3.51* (5.35) 0.02 [0.16, 1.00] 
Time (linear) * zACS 0.13 0.10 1.31 (5.35) 0.24 [-0.12, 0.37] 
Time (quadratic) * zACS -0.03 0.02 -1.41 (5.97) 0.21 [-0.09, 0.03] 
N = 14. * p < .05, ** p < .001. zACSoverall = overall absolute coherence shifting of affect and importance scores. 
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Table F6: Aversive feelings and overall strength of Coherence Shifting in the Study 2 mild and serious disease tasks. 








samples t df P 
Anxious 4.49 (1.61) 5.88 (1.77) 0.426** 7.03** 83 < .001 
Stressed 4.50 (1.84) 5.88 (1.95) 0.496** 6.64** 83 < .001 
Unpleasant 4.49 (187) 5.68 (2.03) 0.373** 4.99** 83 < .001 
Conflicted 4.55 (1.91) 5.27 (2.06) 0.271* 2.77* 83 0.007 
Coherence Shifting 
Importance 0.084 (0.075) 0.308 (0.069) 0.136 -0.072 83 0.943 
Affect 0.101 (0.076) 0.113 (0.082) -0.179 0.940 83 0.350 
N = 84. * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
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Table F7: Descriptive statistics and correlations for Experiment 2 between-task and exploratory analysis. 
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Mild Imp. ACS 0.08 (0.08) 
2 Mild Affect ACS 0.1 (0.08) .113 
3 Serious Imp. ACS 0.08 (0.07) .136 -.062 
4 Serious Affect ACS 0.11 (0.08) -.139 -.179 .219* 
5 BEQ Negative Emotionality 22.85 (6.16) .035 .293** -.020 -.102 
6 BEQ Positive Emotionality 20.75 (3.8) .033 .109 .064 .019 .633** 
7 BEQ Impulse Strength 27.05 (6.41) .041 .273* .017 -.021 .494** .575** 
8 BEQ Overall 70.64 (13.79) .044 .288** .017 -.050 .851** .826** .844** 
9 ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal 29.99 (5.21) .018 .053 -.015 .054 .263* .223* -.089 .137 
10 ERQ Expressive Suppression 13.96 (5.24) .044 -.106 .090 .070 -.667** -.578** -.389** -.638** -.331** 
11 Serious Choice Confidence 3.73 (0.83) .107 .003 -.046 -.044 -.037 .066 -.084 -.037 -.101 
12 Job Choice Confidence 3.38 (0.86) -.068 -.031 -.031 .200 -.116 .136 -.095 -.058 .084 
13 Serious Confidence Change 0.05 (0.73) -.081 -.267* -.102 .181 -.085 -.013 -.148 -.110 .051 
14 Job Confidence Change 0.12 (0.67) -.186 -.084 -.152 .070 -.057 -.021 -.179 -.115 -.062 
10 11 12 13 
11 Mild Choice Confidence .037 
12 Serious Choice Confidence .016 .368** 
13 Mild Confidence Change -.085 .483** .317** 
14 Serious Confidence Change .074 .038 .318** .063 
N = 84. * p < .05, ** p < .001, ACS = Absolute Coherence Shifting, Imp. = Importance, BEQ = Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire, 
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. 
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Appendix G: Aggregate Coherence Shifting Measures 
This method for creating an aggregate coherence shifting measure was adapted 
from Carpenter et al., 2016. To create an aggregate variable for outcome affect ratings, all 
outcome ratings are first linearly transformed to a -1 to +1 scale and then combined using 




�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼,𝐾𝐾 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀,𝐾𝐾 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝐾𝐾 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼,𝐾𝐾
− 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼,𝑀𝑀 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑀𝑀 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼,𝑀𝑀� 
where K is Treatment K, M is Treatment M, and “Admin” is Administration method. 
This will result in a value ranging from -1 to +1, with -1 representing maximum affect-
based favorability towards Treatment M’s outcomes and +1 representing maximum 
favorability to Treatment K’s outcomes. 
This score will be calculated for both pre-choice and mid-choice ratings, and a 
change score for affect between pre- and mid-choice times can be computed as: 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 − 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆−𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆
where negative scores would indicate a shift towards Treatment M and positive 
scores would mean a shift towards Treatment K. (Note that scores above +/-1 are possible 
but would require a large reversal of preferences between these two times.) These 
changes must be examined to ensure they are in the correct direction given the final 
choice. For participants where this is the case, the absolute value of the affect change 
score can be used as a measure of affect coherence shifting magnitude.  
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = �𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 − 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆−𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆� 
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Similarly, a composite variable can be calculated for attribute importance weights 




�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 + 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼� 
where, in the serious disease task, Administration methods and Efficacy are 
favorable for Treatment K, and Side effects and Duration of symptoms are favorable for 
Treatment M (See Table 3). This measure also ranges from -1 to + 1 with positive scores 
being favorable towards Treatment K and negative scores favorable to Treatment M. This 
can also be used to calculate a pre-choice to mid-choice difference score: 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 − 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆−𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆
Then, if the direction of change is appropriate, an absolute measure of magnitude 
is calculated. 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = �𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 − 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆−𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆� 
ACSAff and ACSImp are sufficiently aggregated to be used for between-tasks 
comparisons. 
Additionally, a measure of overall within-task coherence shifting is necessary for 
comparisons with skin conductance. For this individual differences measure, z-scores will 
be taken for the two coherence-shifting variables and summed. 
𝑧𝑧𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑧𝑧(𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) + 𝑧𝑧(𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) 
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